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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal, specifically as to whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s decision to award special allowances for extra duties performed and compensation for moral damages was an error in law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. With respect to the allowance for extra duties, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it is settled in its jurisprudence that the Agency has discretionary powers to pay the special allowances, which must be exercised reasonably in accordance with their substantive legal requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no room for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to substitute its decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a SPA can only be granted if the conditions of ST/AI/1999/17 are met, inter alia, that the staff member has been assigned to and discharged the full functions of a post which has been both classified and budgeted at a higher level, and that these prerequisites were not met. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the denial of the ex gratia payment was lawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration did not commit any errors in exercising its discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the denial of an ex gratia payment did not violate the principle of equal pay for equal value and did not constitute discrimination. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s language, which was strongly critical of the Appellant, was unwarranted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding that the decision to discontinue the payment of her SPA was a legitimate exercise of the Administration¡¯s discretion, as the Appellant no longer met the requirements for it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the discontinuation of the SPA was justified in view of the Administration¡¯s obligation and right to correct such an erroneous situation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Applicant filed the application for a stay of proceedings in her case pending the outcome of an on-going recruitment process to the vacant post. The motion for stay of proceedings was refused because it lacked merit. The application was struck out because the Applicant was inviting the Tribunal to act as ¡°Big Brother¡± and constitute some kind of sword of Damocles over the head of the Respondent by keeping her case alive while the recruitment process was on and to possibly invoke it if she was not happy with the outcome of the exercise. This was an abuse of the Tribunal¡¯s process. In...

The Respondent submits that the contested decision was expressed in a letter dated 3 August 2001 and the claim is therefore time-barred as the Applicant¡¯s request for administrative review, dated 2 May 2005, was filed out of time. The Applicant avers that her application is receivable as the final decision subject to appeal was expressed in the letter of the High Commissioner for Human Rights dated 30 March 2005. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the contested decision was made on 3 August 2001 and that the Applicant was notified of it, at the latest, on or before 15 April 2002. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Applicant...

1998 reclassification: The issue of the 1998 reclassification exercise is long out of time and no circumstances justify the review of it now. 2005 reclassification: Examining the 2005 reclassification exercise is moot as the post was abolished and the applicant did not challenge the abolition. Withdrawal of SPA: In relation to the period for which the applicant¡¯s SPA was withdrawn, it would be reasonable to expect a notation of a change in functions in the e-PAS records as there was a crossover between two cycles. However, there was none and the SPA should thus be retroactively paid...

Receivability: Although the applicant accepted the assignment, this does not mean that all decisions taken by the Administration with respect to the applicant must be deemed correct and lawful. The Organization¡¯s decision to base its calculation of the applicant¡¯s salary on her net income constitutes an administrative decision affecting her contractual right to proper remuneration and the case is therefore receivable. Salary calculation: ST/IC/2007/24 and ST/AI/2000/1 articulate that all G-level staff will be receiving an SPA to the P-2 level. Pursuant to provisional staff rule 3.10(d), the...

The Tribunal finds that the Administration erred in considering that no classification decision had been taken. It further finds that the Applicant duly followed the procedure foreseen in ST/AI/1998/9 and that she was deprived of her right to a remedy. Turning to the question whether such breach resulted in loss of a chance to have her post classified at the P-4 level, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant has not shown that she suffered any actual material harm, given the uncertainty surrounding a possible approval of the new budgetary post by OPPBA and the General Assembly. However, it...

The Tribunal found that most of the Applicant¡¯s claims were time barred and that those which were not time barred were without merit. It was found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵON had paid the Applicant¡¯s SPA for the periods when he was entitled to it and that he no longer had any legitimate claims for SPA against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵON. Employment Contract: A contract of employment is personal between the employee in each case and the employer. The terms of one¡¯s employment as stipulated in the letter of appointment or contract of employment is binding in personam between staff member and the organization and one cannot seek to...

Decisions (a) and (b) are found not receivable and decision (c) is found to be unfounded. The Tribunal also finds that the Applicant¡¯s request for management evaluation (MEU request) included a request for SPA which was not addressed by the Organization. The Applicant did not pursue the applicable procedure established in ST/AI/1998/9. In the absence of an actual administrative decision denying a request for reclassification, the application against the continuous refusal to reclassify his post from the P-4 level to the P-5 level is not receivable.The Applicant¡¯s MEU request indicated that he...