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As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals of two staff members who were not a party to the proceedings before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and had no standing. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was a reviewable administrative decision within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred finding that the announcement by the USG/DGACM dated 8 April 2021 that the daily workload of translators would be increased to 5.8 pages and of self-revisers to 6.4 pages, was not an appealable administrative decision for the purpose of Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claim, that a final decision on her 2013 request for post reclassification was only issued in 2019, could not be considered as it was raised for the first time at the appellate level. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly found that the 12 December 2014 e-mail which informed her that all classifications were on hold constituted an administrative decision because it rejected her request for immediate reclassification. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that to allow the Appellant¡¯s argument that the postponement or freezing of requests for reclassification does not constitute an...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Ms. Matahen. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that her appeal was defective in that it failed to identify any of the five grounds set out in Article 2(1) of the Statute of the Appeals Tribunal as forming the legal basis of her appeal. With regard to Ms. Matahen¡¯s written request for an extension of time to file an application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err in finding that her allegation that she had only found out on 17 August 2020 that another similar request for Early Voluntary Retirement had been granted by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA, did not constitute an exceptional circumstance, namely, a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Ms. Al Smadi. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in its finding that a letter Ms. Al Smadi received to her reclassification request on 17 August 2017 was an administrative decision. The only interpretation of this letter was that it was not a decision that had any legal effect or consequences on Ms. Al Smadi¡¯s terms and conditions of appointment. It was simply a notification that Ms. Al Smadi¡¯s reclassification request was still being reviewed but that the review had not been ¡°finalized¡± or decided upon as of that date. The letter she received on 29 July 2019 was, on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that 25 July 2017 was the relevant date triggering the time limit under Staff Rule 11.2(c). On that date, Ms. Wozniak was informed in unequivocal terms by the Administration that her request for deferment for the 2017 Rotation Exercise had been approved on retirement ground, on the understanding that she would retire on 30 April 2019. Thus, her request for management evaluation dated 24 July 2019 was filed outside the 60-day statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that in any case the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also correctly held that even if it were to entertain that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to find the application non-receivable ratione materiae. At the time of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment, there was no final administrative decision that had direct legal consequences on the Appellant¡¯s terms of employment. In addition, in the intervening time, the Appellant has been selected for the post, and therefore, he has received that which he had sought originally, making his request for rescission of the contested decision moot. Regarding the request for compensation for the pay differential for 17 months, the Tribunal found because there was no appealable...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reversed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judgment finding that the Contested Decision was never implemented. Noting that the issue of mootness was raised for the first time on appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT explained (paras. 32-33): ¡°It is ordinarily impermissible to raise a new point on appeal that is not covered by the pleadings or was not canvassed in the evidence before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, unless the point is jurisdictional in nature. A question of jurisdiction may always be advanced on appeal for the first time. The reason for the jurisdictional exception is obvious. The principle of legality prohibits the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT from assuming a...

The Tribunal found that the Applicant never made any appeal or request to the ABCC for reconsideration of the impugned decision in accordance with art. 17(a) of former Appendix D and that the application was therefore not receivable ratione materiae on that count. The Tribunal concluded that since the 6 February 2019 email was not an appeal/request for reconsideration of the Respondent¡¯s decision, the only contestable decision was one dated 15 January 2019. The Applicant had 30 days to contest that decision by filing a request for reconsideration pursuant to art. 17(a) of former Appendix D but...

The Tribunal held that: the Applicant had not shown which terms of his appointment or which rules and regulations were violated by the Administration¡¯s failure to reclassify a post he coveted and to budget for it; that he had not shown that the classification process had been completed; and that he was challenging a final decision from that process as per the provisions of ST/AI/1998/9.

The Tribunal further held that the Applicant had failed to identify an administrative decision capable of being reviewed, that is, a final, precise decision taken by a competent authority having direct adverse...

The contested decision identified by the Applicant is not a final administrative decision that is related to the Applicant¡¯s terms of appointment or contract of employment. It is an operational decision of general application that promoted a change in the reporting lines of all staff members serving in that organization. Such a decision is within the scope of the managerial discretion of the organization in question. Accordingly, the application is not receivable ratione materiae.