The Administration paid the compensation ordered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and the Secretary-General subsequently filed his cross-appeal challenging Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision to award compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, by paying the compensation ordered, the Secretary-General accepted the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and that his cross-appeal was, therefore, moot.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant¡¯s request that her challenge of the first recruitment process be placed in abeyance until completion of the second recruitment process was unusual and rightly declined by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no right of the Appellant was infringed upon, as she had not been denied an opportunity to compete for the post in question. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment.
In considering the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Standing Committee could not reject the request unless it disregarded the provisions of Article 33(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was not in a position to rule on the actual possibility for the Appellant to perform the duties of her respective position and held that the Standing Committee should reconsider the Appellant¡¯s request. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rescinded the Standing Committee¡¯s decision and remanded the Appellant¡¯s request to the Standing Committee for review.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT findings that there was no flaw in the procedure used by the Staff Management Coordinating Committee to select the staff representative on the IJC. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgments rejecting the staff member¡¯s allegations of conflict of interest on the part of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judges. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further rejected the staff member¡¯s request that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judges recuse themselves from the hearing of the appeal, noting the limited role of the IJC in the appointment of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judges and the lack of any professional relationship between the person appointed as a staff representative and...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it decided to give Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR the option to either pay compensation in lieu of reinstating the Appellant or quash the contested administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 10. 5(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute was not applicable as the Appellant was serving under an indefinite appointment governed by Rule 104. 12(c) of the Staff Rules (100 Series). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT expressed that the contested administrative decision did not concern his appointment, promotion, or termination but his placement between assignments. For this reason, Article 10.5(a)...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellants did not refer to any article of the Regulations that provides that the full retirement benefit may be restored after a participant opts to commute a portion of the retirement benefit into a lump sum. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellants were bound by their decision to accept one-third of their pension as a lump sum and a reduced pension. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s decision could not simply be reversed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the argument that the Appellants had been discriminated against and that their basic fundamental rights concerning equity, fairness, and justice under...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeals against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT decisions ordering the suspension of the contested decisions beyond the deadline for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT clarified that, generally, only appeals against final judgments would be receivable, because otherwise, cases would seldom proceed if either party was dissatisfied with a procedural ruling. Article 2.2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute authorizes Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to order suspension of a contested decision only ¡°during the pendency of the management evaluation¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering suspension of the contested...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and affirmed the decisions of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPB Standing Committee. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant¡¯s first ground of appeal had no merit, noting that the Appellant had prior notice of her separation and could have exercised her right to restore her participation prior to the time of her separation in accordance with Section F. 1 of the Pension Fund¡¯s Administrative Rules, which she failed to do. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Standing Committee had no discretion to make an exception in this case and the Standing Committee¡¯s decision not to restore the Appellant¡¯s prior...
The Secretary-General appealed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT order. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, where the implementation of an administrative decision is imminent, through no fault or delay on the part of the staff member, and takes place before the five days provided for under Article 13 of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP have elapsed, and where Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is not in a position to make a decision under Article 2. 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, i. e. because it requires further information or time to reflect on the matter, it must have the discretion to grant a suspension of action for these five days. To find otherwise would render Article 2. 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals by the Secretary-General of Order Nos. 30 (NBI/2011) and 33 (NBI/2011). Order No. 30 (NBI/2011) extended the suspension of action until 13 May 2011, beyond the date on which the management evaluation was completed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should have granted a suspension until 13 May 2011 or until the completion of management evaluation if the latter was earlier. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction and committed an error of law. Order No. 33 (NBI/2011) extended the suspension until the final determination of the case, and therefore beyond the completion of...
