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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both Mr Schoone and the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, for the reasons set forth in judgment Nos. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-357 (Malmstrom et al. ), 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-358 (Longone) and 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359 (Ademagic et al. ), the delegation of authority granted to the ICTY Registrar could not be construed so as to grant him the authority to convert staff members¡¯ fixed-term appointments into permanent appointments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that in those three cases it had held that the decision-making authority to grant permanent appointments was properly vested in the Assistant Secretary-General for...

Noting the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that administrative review by ICAO is the equivalent of management evaluation under Article 7(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, and Article 7(3) must be interpreted in the same manner as Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that Article 7(3) prohibited Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT from waiving the deadline by which the Appellant was required to seek administrative review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not have jurisdiction or competence to address the merits of the substantive claims of the Appellant since AJAB did not consider the merits of those claims as the neutral first instance...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err on questions of fact by ignoring or failing to examine what the Appellant considered to be evidence, which constituted mere allegations and unsubstantiated argumentation on his part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not support his submission by any grounds which would bring the issue within the remit of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Noting that the Appellant relied upon the statements and observations which he had brought before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a litigant¡¯s past allegations and arguments cannot be considered evidence per se. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not the task of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT (or Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT)...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and its conclusion that the application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a request for management evaluation must be submitted prior to bringing an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, even if the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) had failed to resolve the Appellant¡¯s complaints about the contested decision, she still had the opportunity to file a timely application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for judicial review after she receive the response from the MEU but had chosen not to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence and jurisdiction in addressing...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was not manifestly unreasonable in concluding that the date upon which the Appellant was on notice that he had received a response from the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) or that it was his responsibility to read the MEU response as soon as possible. On the question of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and/or failed to exercise its jurisdiction in declining to consider the case on the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in the absence of a prior written request for a suspension or waiver of the time limit for filing his application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not competent to consider the issue...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there had been a policy change in 1997 which meant that staff members who requested pension as a result of an accident suffered in the service of the Organisation post-1997 were granted it with the proviso that it would only be paid until they retired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as the Appellant¡¯s accident occurred long after the policy change in 1997, the changed policy was applicable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant had reached retirement age at the time of the incapacitating injury, his appeal had to be dismissed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the facts upon which the sanction was based had not been established by clear and convincing evidence, albeit for different reasons than given by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the evidence from two witnesses had little probative value was correct because although written witness statements taken under oath can be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence the facts to support the dismissal of a staff member when a statement is not made under oath or affirmation, there must be some other indicia of...

On the issue of whether it had been established by clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant had possession of, and traded in, Tramal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s credibility determinations, analysis and conclusions and accepted its factual findings. On the issue of whether the established facts showed misconduct, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that misconduct based on underlying criminal acts does not depend upon the staff member being convicted of a crime in a national court. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled the jurisprudence of the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal that different onuses and burdens of proof arise under...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in assessing whether the publication complained of constituted an administrative decision, correctly determined that the Appellant had not identified any terms or conditions of his former employment which had been violated. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in reaching its decision, correctly assessed the publication of the President¡¯s Order against the definition of an administrative decision and was correct in finding that both the determination that a ruling on a request for recusal should be issued in the form of an order or of a judgment and the decision to publish such rulings on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that the application was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT has, in principle, the discretion to accept Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA¡¯s late reply in circumstances where Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA has not filed a motion seeking leave to do so and without proprio motu ordering Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA to file a reply. Noting the Administration¡¯s reply was due before the transitional period into the new system of justice began, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred when it granted a waiver of time after an excessive period of time had passed which was based on inaccurate facts and an invalid reason. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...