Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for interpretation of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-026bis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the language of the judgment was clear in its meaning and required no interpretation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant filed her claim against the wrong entity (the Secretary-General) when her case was, in actual fact, against Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the claim was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal to JAB was also out of time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was time-barred and, therefore, not receivable. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, even if the appeal was receivable, there did not appear to be valid grounds for contesting the decision to withdraw the offer of appointment or for requesting compensation for loss of earnings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that the request for the removal of the defense brief from the file, as it contained information relating to the informal dispute resolution process, could have been taken into consideration since Article 15 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT RoP provides that such information shall remain confidential and never...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant was asked to present updated medical information to support her request for a review of her case and failed to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no prejudice existed against the Appellant, since she had an opportunity to present updated medical evidence within the scope of the review of her case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Standing Committee decision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellants each failed to bring themselves under the exceptional circumstances provision of former Staff Rule 111. 2(f). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no legal difference between exceptional circumstances and exceptional cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a delay can generally be excused only because of circumstances beyond an Appellant¡¯s control. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no error in fact or in law was made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referenced the Shanks jurisprudence (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-026bis) where it held that the authority of a final judgment - res judicata - cannot be so readily set aside. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there are only limited grounds as enumerated in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute for review of a final judgment and an allegation of an error in law is not one of them. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application to set aside and remand the previous judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General on the matter of the interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has the power to award interest but erred in ordering the payment of interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal in part, set aside the award of interest from the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment, and awarded interest at the US Prime Rate applicable at the date that the entitlements became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the judgment was not executed within 60 days, five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate from the date of expiry of the 60-day period to the date of payment of the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT stated that an Application for Interpretation is not receivable if its actual purpose is to have Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT re-examine its decision, even though its judgments are final and without appeal, or to have it comment on its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the applications made under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 30 of the appeal, with the purpose of either calling into question the decision or having Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT issue comments on the decision, were not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the use of the word ¡°annul¡± would not lead to confusion in the mind of a party in good faith because the language of...

The applicant did not have a legitimate expectancy of renewal. No express promise by the Administration could be found. Had there been one, the letters of appointment signed by the applicant explicitly state that fixed-term appointments do not carry any expectancy of renewal. No promise could override the clear words of the letters of appointment signed subsequently. It cannot be stated that the non-renewal decision was based on improper motives or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. The Organization was not bound to give any justification for not extending the applicant¡¯s fixed-term...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was unable to show any illegality of fact, procedure or law in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment which might have compelled it to decide in his favour. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that to report to work on time, regularly, and without break is a basic duty of anyone who is employed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was given a fair hearing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and the reasons for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT dismissing his appeal were valid. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision not to renew the Appellant¡¯s contract was validly taken and called for no interference. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a (second) appeal by the Appellant. Taking into account that neither Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nor Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had been presented with any submission on the merits of the case, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT ordered the Appellant to file a concise statement identifying the precise nature of his claim within 15 days. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and set aside the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had erred in law by upholding the decision to summarily dismiss the staff member, which was taken in violation of the requirements of adversarial proceedings and due process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while the use of statements gathered in the course of an investigation from witnesses who remain anonymous throughout the proceedings, including before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, cannot be excluded as a matter of principle from disciplinary matters, a disciplinary measure may not be founded solely on anonymous statements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT ordered rescission of the contested decision to summarily dismiss the staff...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct to find that it was not competent to consider the application as far as it concerned the decision not to award Ms Megerditchian a service contract since such contracts were awarded to non-staff members. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in receiving the application in respect of a service contract. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in its interpretation of the term priority consideration and that a promise of priority consideration in a job application did not by itself give rise to a legal right on the part of Ms...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal against Order No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/NBI/O/2010/023 by the Secretary-General. Applying the principle that a party in whose favour a case has been decided is not permitted to appeal against the judgment on legal or academic grounds, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Order had no practical effect following the withdrawal of the request for suspension of action. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was moot as it was academic and sought an opinion regarding the issues raised in the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT observed that the Appellant did not challenge the reasoning of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, but appealed on the ground that the administrative policy in place should be changed because she was promoted but her gross income was reduced. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant¡¯s pay calculations also took into account other deductions and increases such that her net income increased. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the real issue before it was whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made a reversible error in fact or law such that it must allow the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not disagree that, on its face, the calculations of her salary were made...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected an application by the Staff Union of the ICTY for leave to file a friend-of-the court brief under Article 17 of its Rules of Procedure on the scope of review of the Secretary-General¡¯s decision in disciplinary proceedings and the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings, on the basis that the facts and legal issues were not so complex that the brief would assist it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in exercising judicial review, may interfere with the exercise of the Secretary-General¡¯s discretion in disciplinary proceedings against a staff member on the ground...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that an expression of interest by a staff member in the renewal of his or her appointment does not create a right of renewal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the document that Ms Beaudry signed acknowledging her performance rating and the recommendation of her supervisor for no further extension of her appointment was decisive documentary evidence in the case; she knew that the section of the form, providing details of the justification for the recommendation for non-extension, was not completed and nonetheless acknowledged the recommendation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment in Rosca was no longer good law, having been overruled by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT in Costa. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that time limits prescribed for administrative review and management evaluation (in the new system) could not be waived under Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, due to a specific prohibition in this respect contained in Article 8(4) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, as interpreted by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in Costa and affirmed by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was time-barred and the delay in filing could not be condoned. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal that centred on whether the Appellant should be awarded enhanced compensation of three months¡¯ net base salary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not make a reversible error in declining to award compensation for moral suffering. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the case was distinguishable from Mebtouche (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2009/039), where the Applicant, Mr Mebtouche, had already retired and had no chance of being promoted, therefore enhanced compensation was justified. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that enhanced compensation could not be awarded to the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal centred on the receivability of the appeal to the JAB. The Appellant had sought a waiver of the time limit to appeal before JAB on the basis that his legal counsel was away from Syria for medical treatment for a year. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the Appellant¡¯s 18-month delay in filing his appeal pending either his counsel¡¯s return or replacement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB properly considered that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to file an appeal to the JAB. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and...