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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-015 by Ms. Macharia. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms. Macharia provided no evidence upon which it could infer that there was bias or likelihood of bias on the part of Judge Izuako. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, with regard to the Legal Officer who allegedly had a personal friendship with Judge Boolell, there was no evidence for it to draw the conclusion that the Legal Officer influenced the proceedings or the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judge in her decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms. Macharia did not offer any evidence in support of her bare assertions casting serious doubt on the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr El Khatib¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-142. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr El Khatib did not identify any fact unknown at the time of the impugned judgment which could justify its review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that what he actually sought was a discussion of the amount of compensation awarded to him, an option not granted by the Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the petition did not meet the statutory requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Basenko¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the reference made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to the precedent in Gabaldon (judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139) could not be regarded as a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was unable to see any valid ground for revision within the purview of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-158. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no new fact such as to meet the criteria set out in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker sought to re-argue or reopen issues. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that insofar as Mr Laeijendecker sought interpretation of the impugned judgment, paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 were clear on their face and had to be read in conjunction with paragraphs 27 and 28, and paragraphs 32-35. On the allegation of bias, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker¡¯s submissions amounted to no more than completely...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for interpretation by Mr Shkurtaj on the issue of interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Warren (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-059) and Mmata (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-092) for the holding that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the interest payable was at the US Prime Rate and that an extra five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate if the judgment was not executed within 60 days of its issuance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the date from which interest on the compensation was to be paid at the US Prime Rate was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-154. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the new evidence was irrelevant because the case was not receivable; neither Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nor Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Sims¡¯ case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

The current Application for suspension of action must be adjudicated against the stipulated cumulative test, in that the Applicant must establish that the impugned decision is prima facie unlawful, calls for urgent adjudication and that implementation of the impugned decision would cause him irreparable harm. The Tribunal finds no impropriety in the Respondent¡¯s application of the staff retention criteria in respect of the Applicant. This Application therefore fails on the limb of prima facie unlawfulness therefore. Having found that the impugned decision is not unlawful, and given that the...

The contested decision was not, in itself, unfavourable to the Applicant since it did not prevent her from applying for the position again. The only decision which the Applicant would have had a legitimate interest in contesting, was the decision not to appoint her to the position she encumbered after its reclasification as Senior Career Management Assistant at the G-5 level. However, the Applicant did not contest this decision. The application was not receivable, since the Applicant did not have any legitimate interest in requesting the suspension of the decision to readvertise the position...

Placing the Applicant on SLWFP. The Tribunal agrees with and adopts the Kamunyi reasoning that former staff rule 105.2 did not permit placing a staff member on SLWFP where an investigation was being made into possible wrong-doing by that staff member. The formal nature of the OIOS/PTF investigation. A preliminary investigation under ST/AI/371, sec. 2, is differentiated from a formal investigation under ST/AI/371, sec. 6, as occupying different places within the overall structure of ST/AI/371. For an investigation to be regarded as merely preliminary in nature, some ¡°reason to believe¡± must...

Scope of the case. The Applicant¡¯s claims of harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority presented to the JAB were not independent claims in and of themselves, but merely constituted support for the Applicant¡¯s contention that her due process rights had been violated in the context of the non-renewal and non-extension. Considering the posture of the case presented to the JAB and on review by the Dispute Tribunal, the Tribunal is without authority to re-examine the investigation into the Applicant¡¯s sexual harassment charges. Exceptional case. With respect to the determination whether...

The Initial Reprimand. The provisions of ST/AI/292 and the doctrine of audi alteram partem were not observed in that the Applicant was not afforded an opportunity to see and to comment on the reprimand before it was issued for which reason he had no opportunity to comment on it in advance. The Reinstated Reprimand. The Tribunal identified the following difficulties with the Reinstated Reprimand: (1) as with the Initial Reprimand, the Applicant was not permitted to see and to comment on the Reinstated Reprimand in accordance with ST/AI/292; (2) the rules and regulations of the Organization...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT noted that the Applicant exceeded the mandatory time limit for requesting management evaluation of the contested decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that the application was irreceivable as time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT rejected the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that the application was irreceivable because the Applicant failed to submit his request for management evaluation in due time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT rejected the application for suspension of action.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nted that the Applicants¡¯ requests for management evaluation were submitted after the applicable deadline had already expired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT noted that, while the Applicants were active and diligent in bringing their concerns and grievances to higher authorities, these actions did not constitute sending a request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that the application for suspension of action was irreceivable as time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT rejected the application for suspension of action.

Outcome: The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s due process rights were observed by the Organization in its handling of the complaint and rejected the application in its entirety. The Tribunal found that the actions of the Organization in handling the complaint, both individually and in aggregate, met the requirements of due process.

The Applicant¡¯s alleged abuse of Buddy qualified as such conduct. Not returning the Applicant to the Canine Unit. It was proper not to return the Applicant to his former job after the disciplinary case against him had been dismissed. Not returning Buddy. Since Buddy was surrendered to the custody of the New York State Police, the United Nations would appear to have transferred back the property rights over Buddy to the New York State Police. Regardless of the outcome of the disciplinary case against the Applicant, it would therefore seem that the Respondent is not able to return Buddy to the...

On 31 December 2010 the Tribunal granted suspension of action pending management evaluation, pursuant to Order No. 338 (NY/2010). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that it was evident that the decision not to renew the Applicant was influenced by at least some improper considerations that, as a result, it was satisfied of the prima facie unlawfulness of the decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also held that the situation held particular urgency. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT further held that, given the criticisms made of the Applicant¡¯s performance, it was reasonable to conclude that if the contested decision was not suspended, irreparable harm to the Applicant...

The impugned decision was suspended until when the matter would be heard and determined on the merits.

Receivability: The Applicant¡¯s request for administrative review was made outside the mandatory time limit. In accordance with article 8.3 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute, the Tribunal may not suspend or waive the deadlines in the Staff Rules concerning requests for administrative review or management evaluation. There is no basis in the former Staff Rules for finding that time to request an administrative review should only be calculated from the end of the involvement of the Ombudsperson. The terms of reference of the Joint Ombudsperson are inconsistent with the Staff Rules. The...

The application was dismissed in its entirety upon the resolution of the dispute by an agreement reached through mediation.