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This application does not meet the requirements of art. 12(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and art. 30 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Rules of Procedure. There is no need to clarify the meaning of Judgment Ocokoru Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2015/004 since it was fully implemented years ago. Furthermore, the grounds submitted by the Applicant as a basis for interpretation have already been clearly and unambiguously determined by this Tribunal previously. Consequently, the Tribunal dismisses the application in its entirety.

Referring to its previous judgment in the Applicant¡¯s non-selection case, the Tribunal was of the view that in the present application for interpretation, he essentially disagreed with the Tribunal¡¯s findings on the propriety of the impugned selection exercise. Specifically, the Applicant takes issue with the Tribunal¡¯s finding in paragraph 60(b) that he ¡°failed to substantiate that the chosen candidate was not qualified either academically or by way of relevant managerial and supply chain experience¡±.

The Tribunal held that paragraph 60(b) of the judgment was both comprehensible and clear...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal of the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the paragraphs of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment in question were in a plain, unambiguous language that left no reasonable doubt as to their meaning and that they required no interpretation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in holding that the application for interpretation was receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should have dealt with the claim for interest in its judgment, but it omitted to do so. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence by wrongly applying Article 12(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute to alter the substance of its final ruling by...

A judgment must be uncertain or ambiguous to be open to interpretation by the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that paragraph 19 of the judgment was an obiter observation by the Tribunal and did not have a bearing on the reasoning or outcome of the final judgment. The Tribunal found that paragraph 19 was neither uncertain nor ambiguous. The Tribunal held that Article 12.3 must not be used to re-open proceedings, and this is what the Applicant had attempted to do.

Standard of review for interpretation (1): A request for interpretation of a judgment is receivable only if the operative part of it gives rise to uncertainty or ambiguity about its meaning or import.Standard of review for interpretation (2): It would be contrary to the letter and spirit of article 12.3 of the Tribunal¡¯s Statute to seek a reversal or modification of a final judgment under cover of interpretation. The correctness of a judgment is not a matter to be dealt with in this framework, as interpreting, by definition, means shedding light on the original meaning, as opposed to altering...

Receivability: The Tribunal considered whether it has the requisite jurisdiction to make a determination on an application for interpretation of an order as opposed to a final judgment. Noting that: (i) there is no provision in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute or Rules of Procedure governing interpretation of orders or expressly prohibiting interpretation of a decision that is labeled ¡°Order¡±; and (ii) that regardless of whether decisions on applications for suspension of action are labeled as orders or judgments, they determine substantial issues, the Tribunal, pursuant to articles 19 and 36 of the Rules of...

The Tribunal held that there are two stages in the procedure for the interpretation of a judgment. First, receivability must be determined and secondly if it is receivable whether it should be interpreted. Receivability: The Tribunal considered whether the filing of an appeal should be taken to mean that it is under consideration and therefore debar an applicant from an interpretation. The Tribunal held that the mere filing of an appeal against a judgment by one party to a case constitutes no legal impediment to the other party filing for an interpretation because the filing of an appeal is...

Interpretation ¨C As held in Sidell 2014-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-489 and Abbasi 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-315, the purpose of interpretation is not to determine the disagreement of an applicant with a judgment who wishes to reargue an appeal. Interpretation is only needed to clarify the meaning of a judgment when it leaves reasonable doubts about the will of the Tribunal or the arguments leading to a decision. But if the judgment is comprehensible, whatever the opinion the parties may have about it or its reasoning, an application for interpretation is not admissible.

The application was receivable as it was filed in accordance with the requirements set forth in article 12.3 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and article 30 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP.; The payment of salaries to the Applicant should have been calculated as of the time of separation (30 November 2009) with accrued interest.; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered that the Secretary-General add a pre-judgment interest on the compensation already paid, calculated at the US Prime Rate applicable on 30 November 2009 (date of separation) to 9 December 2016 (date of payment). All other pleas were refused.

The Tribunal cannot consider a hypothetical scenario concerning which there is no instant case or controversy before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the request for interpretation noting that the decision was clear and unambiguous and considered the Applicant¡¯s request to, in essence, be requesting the Tribunal to address a hypothetical future scenario.