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The Tribunal found that, in the present case, there is no dispute that the decision was unilaterally made by the administration and that it involved the exercise of a power or the performance of a statutory instrument. The dispute is on whether the decision adversely affected the rights of the Applicant and produced direct legal consequences.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s argument that ¡°Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS not only decided to charge [him], but also to maintain him in an indefinite status of ¡°charged person,¡± leaving him indeterminately prosecuted; since as¡ªat the time of the Application¡ªhe had...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by the staff member. On the confidentiality issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the staff member¡¯s claim that some findings of the impugned judgment had not been shared with her. Regarding the delay in the response to the request for management evaluation, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the staff member had failed to demonstrate how the alleged delay of response on the part of the Administration had prejudiced her or had violated her due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the staff member had failed to demonstrate any error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal, in which she alleged that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted inappropriately in granting a summary judgment, that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision, and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction or competence in awarding costs against her. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was entirely appropriate after the case management process had been concluded, for the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to grant a summary judgment and that there was no legitimate inference that its decision to do so was influenced by any bias or prejudgment on the part of the Presiding Judge. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a response (or non-response) to a request for management evaluation is a decision or action of a complementary nature, lacking in the qualities of finality and consequence, and thus will not constitute an administrative decision that is alleged to be in non-compliance with the terms of appointment or contract of employment as contemplated in Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in its finding that the application was not receivable ratione materiae and that it hence lacked jurisdiction.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s motion for leave to file additional pleadings and the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that neither the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute nor the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT RoP provide for an appellant to file an additional pleading after the respondent has filed an answer. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that Article 31(1) of the RoP and Section II. A. 3 of Practice Direction No. 1 of the Appeals Tribunal allow the Appeals Tribunal to grant a party¡¯s motion to file additional pleadings only if there are exceptional circumstances justifying the motion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any exceptional circumstances...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for correction of judgment for judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-940 filed by Mr Wilson in order to reflect a correction of dates that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had made to its own judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was necessary to correct the date of the receipt of a Management Evaluation Unit response, a crucial factor for calculating time limits under the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, as, without the correction, the Appellant¡¯s application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT would have been not receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT granted the Appellant¡¯s application and ordered the correction of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s reasoning that the letter of 24 November 2017 was unambiguous and unconditional about the separation of Ms Patkar upon the expiration of her appointment and agreed that the letter conveyed the final decision of the Administration not to renew her appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the letter produced a direct adverse consequence which was not contingent upon the possibility of Ms Patkar¡¯s selection for any other position. Nor did the relevant provision in the letter that the non-renewal decision would cease to be applicable if Ms Patkar should be selected for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in stating that it had no jurisdiction as Mr Kebede¡¯s claim concerned the internal affairs of the staff union, and therefore, an area protected from employer interference. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, however, that error was without consequence because Mr Kebede¡¯s claim for compensation was otherwise time-barred per Staff Rule 3.17(ii). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also erred in finding that Mr Kebede¡¯s application for a transfer was not receivable for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal finds that the application is not receivable because the contested decision is not a disciplinary measure within the meaning of staff rule 11.2(b) and accordingly the time limits applicable under art. 8.1(d)(i) of the Tribunal¡¯s Statute should have been complied with. It clearly follows from staff rule 11.2(b) that the exemption from the requirement to request the management evaluation of a disciplinary measure only applies to disciplinary measures imposed following the completion of a disciplinary process.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Application and the claims contained in it were time barred and not receivable. Time Limits: It is an Applicant¡¯s responsibility to ensure that he or she is aware of the applicable procedure in the context of the administration of justice at the United Nations and ignorance cannot be invoked as an excuse for filing out of the stipulated time limits. Applicants must strictly adhere to procedural requirements prior to the commencement of formal litigation proceedings.