Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the appeal as Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that applications to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT were only receivable if the applicant had previously submitted the contested administrative decision for management evaluation and that management evaluation was a mandatory first step. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that applications to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, be they from serving or former staff members (such as the Appellant), are only receivable if the applicant has previously submitted the contested administrative decision for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the Appellant¡¯s interpretation of the relevant provisions that, as a former staff member, he was exempted from the requirement for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s consideration that in the event of any ambiguity or contradiction between the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and the Staff Rules, the former must...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had made no error in finding that as a General Service staff member at the G-5 level, the Applicant was not eligible to apply for the vacancy advertised in the JO, which was a post in the Professional category at the P-5 level and that, therefore, the disputed decision had no legal consequences affecting him and no effect on his rights and terms of employment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in its finding that the Appellant was not claiming a right to be consulted as an individual staff member, but rather, in his capacity as a staff representative. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT addressed all the appeals in a unique judgment. Regarding judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2015/100, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff member cannot bring an application against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General challenging a decision by the Organisation denying him or her employment with the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly concluded that the application was not receivable. Regarding Orders Nos. 319, 320, and 400, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reiterated that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT is only under exceptional circumstances competent to judge appeals of interlocutory orders, namely when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction...
As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s daughters applications for intervention which argued that they had been deprived of their right to education due to their mother¡¯s arbitrary separation from service, as their mother lost her only main source of income, including the education grant, and could not support their education. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the daughters did not fall within the categories of persons who had the standing to intervene, and denied the applications for intervention. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed...
On the termination decision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision that an individual contracted under an ICA was not a staff member and therefore had no standing before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred the matter of the lack of judicial recourse for individual contractors to the attention of the President of the General Assembly for consideration and possible action. On the decision to recover monies, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while management evaluation was not required to appeal the imposition of a disciplinary measure, such an argument was not valid in this case because the recovery of monies was not a disciplinary...
This case was presided by Judge Halfeld, and Judge Murphy drafted the majority opinion. The Majority (Halfeld, Murphy, Raikos and Knierim) dismissed the appeal and held that the appeal was not receivable. Without deciding on the issue whether the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has an inherent right to hold a non-party in contempt, the Majority found that the appeal did not meet the requirements of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. The Majority explained that it had jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear and pass judgment on an appeal pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Statute in which it is asserted that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has: (a) exceeded its...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General was correct to bide his time and to await the outcome on the merits before determining whether an appeal was necessary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the Secretary-General was not time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that Mr. Arango was a former staff member for the purposes of founding jurisdiction over the instant application: At the time of the contested decision not to select him Mr. Arango had been separated from service for more than two years, was no longer a staff member in the...
A summary judgment was rendered because, as per art. 9 of the RoP, there was no dispute as to the material facts and judgment was restricted to matters of law. As one of the Applicants did not file an application in person (art. 8.1 (b), 3.1 and 2.1 of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute) neither designated a counsel to act on his behalf (art. 12 of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP), his application was deemed as not receivable. Furthermore, considering that an apology is beyond the remedies which may be ordered by the Tribunal in accordance with art. 10.5 of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the application was declared as out of the Tribunal¡¯s mandate.
