Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2022/136, Kamal
The application is not receivable ratione temporis as time-barred.
The application is not receivable ratione temporis as time-barred.
The application is partly non-receivable and, is rejected on the merits. The Applicant¡¯s objection to General Assembly¡¯s decision to restructure the D-1 level position and to submit the selection of the Secretary of the Board to a competitive process by the Succession Planning Committee is not reviewable by the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was afforded full and fair consideration and the non-selection decision was lawful. The Tribunal found that the USG/DMSPC lawfully assigned the Applicant to a suitable position in the Secretariat in order to retain his employment at the D...
The Applicant was notified of the decision in writing by email dated 17 June 2022. Accordingly, he was required to file his application by 15 September 2022. However, the Applicant filed it on 18 September 2022. The application was therefore not filed within the deadlines stipulated by the Tribunal's Statute. Further, the Applicant did not request a waiver of the deadline before filing his late application or in the late application itself. The application was found to not be receivable.
The Applicant received the contested decision on 5 May 2021. If he wished to challenge his reassignment, he should have filed a management evaluation request by 4 July 2021 but did not do so until 30 November 2021. Thus, his applicaiton was found to not be receivable.
Pursuant to staff rule 11.2(c), the Applicant should have requested management evaluation of the 31 August 2021 decision by 30 October 2021, or even earlier, if the intent was to argue against the recovery decision communicated between 30 June and 9 July. The Applicant was contemplating resorting to management evaluation already in July 2021, he, however, requested management evaluation only on 3 November 2021, which was after both deadlines.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claim, that a final decision on her 2013 request for post reclassification was only issued in 2019, could not be considered as it was raised for the first time at the appellate level. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT correctly found that the 12 December 2014 e-mail which informed her that all classifications were on hold constituted an administrative decision because it rejected her request for immediate reclassification. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that to allow the Appellant¡¯s argument that the postponement or freezing of requests for reclassification does not constitute an...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered an appeal by Mr Wu and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the cross-appeal was receivable, despite it being a default judgment and the Secretary-General not having been allowed to participate in the proceedings or to file a reply. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the application was not receivable ratione materiae on the basis that he had not made a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT had no jurisdiction to address the merits of the claims in the application and those claims were not properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT for consideration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that...
Regardless of how the Applicant may intend to define the contested decision, it is clear from the application and its supporting documents, as well as from the request for management evaluation, that the events in dispute date back to March and April 2019. The Applicant therefore missed the 60-day deadline to request management evaluation of the contested decision. The application not receivable ratione materiae.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT¡¯s decision on an Appellant¡¯s request to suspend, waive or extend deadlines is not a judgment made in respect of an appeal against an administrative decision, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT Statute, since no appeal had yet been filed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held, therefore, that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT¡¯s decision on the Appellant¡¯s request of extension could not be appealed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT judgment.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Appellants each failed to bring themselves under the exceptional circumstances provision of former Staff Rule 111. 2(f). Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that there was no legal difference between exceptional circumstances and exceptional cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that a delay can generally be excused only because of circumstances beyond an Appellant¡¯s control. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that no error in fact or in law was made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT dismissed the appeal.