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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was not a staff member, as he was not supported by the Secretary-General in terms of Staff Regulation 4. 1 and was not subject to the Secretary-General¡¯s authority, but rather he was elected by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in dismissing the application as not receivable ratione personae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly distinguished ILOAT judgment No. 3359, noting that the ILOAT¡¯s jurisdiction ratione personae is broader than Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction, in that it may be invoked by ¡°officials¡±, which includes judges. Noting that the current...

The Applicant, as an ad litem judge of the ICTY, is considered to be a ¡°non-Secretariat United Nations official¡±. It follows that the Applicant cannot be considered as a former United Nations staff member within the meaning of art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute. Whilst being fully cognizant of the Applicant¡¯s right to access to justice, the Tribunal is forced to apply its Statute, which prevents it from asserting jurisdiction over the application. As the Applicant does not fall under any of the categories of potential applicants described in art. 3.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute...