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The suspension of action was granted and the adverse report ordered to be removed from the applicant¡¯s official status file pending the outcome of the substantive proceeding.

Two types of interim measures - with different functions, preconditions, restrictions and scope - have to be clearly distinguished. Art. 13 RoP has to be applied exclusively during the pendency of the management evaluation, whereas art. 14 RoP is appropriate only during judicial review in terms of art. 2 and 8 Statute; in short: it is either 13 or 14 ¨C never both. Orders based on art. 13 RoP become ineffective with the end of management evaluation. The present application had to be considered under art. 13 RoP since the contested decision of 12 October 2009 was released under new conditions...

The application was not receivable under article 13 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Rules of Procedure because at the time the application was filed, there was no management evaluation pending. It was only on 21 October 2009 that the Tribunal received a copy of the request for management evaluation of the decision of 5 October 2009. The application was not receivable under article 14 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Rules of Procedure because the administrative decision dated 5 October 2009 to fill the post related to an appointment and could not be the subject of interim relief in view of the exception contained in article 14...

Respondent¡¯s Counsel filed a motion seeking an extension of the time limit to file the Respondent¡¯s reply on several grounds, including exigencies of service. The Respondent was enjoined to submit a proper application requesting that he should be allowed to take part in the proceedings. The determination of whether he was going to be authorized to file a reply was going to be taken in the light of the Respondent¡¯s motion.

The Applicant addressed a letter dated 29 May 2009 to the Secretary-General requesting him to ¡°reverse that decision¡± but no mention was made of the non-renewal of the Applicant¡¯s contract because it was only on 30 June 2009 that the Applicant was informed that his contract would not be renewed beyond 30 September 2009. The Applicant sought to establish that he had in fact requested a review of the decision and referred to an email he had sent to the Registrar of the ICTR in which he informed him that he was contesting the decision not to renew his contract. That email was dated 27 April 2009...

The Dispute Tribunal may suspend or waive the deadlines for the filing of applications imposed by the Statute and Rules of Procedure, but may not suspend or waive the deadlines in the Staff Rules concerning management evaluation because this is the prerogative of the Secretary-General.The drafters of the Statute of the Dispute Tribunal intended that all applications to the Tribunal would be subject to the rules under which this Tribunal operates. Therefore, pursuant to Article 8.3 of the Statute, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the deadlines for the filing of requests for...

Unlawfulness: There has to be evidence to establish that, at the very least, it is probable that the non-renewal decision of itself was unlawful. Irreparable harm: Harm is irreparable if it can be shown that suspension of the action is the only way to ensure that the applicant¡¯s rights are observed. Although the applicant has expectation of fair treatment, any breach of due process in this case is capable of being compensated financially or by correction of the performance record. Should he be ultimately vindicated, he can get compensation for any losses arising out of defects in the...

Decisions made prior to 2 April 2009 are not excluded from being challenged before the Dispute Tribunal. Outcome: The application was held to be receivable and the motion to dismiss was denied. The instant case was also held to be exceptional, deserving of the waiver and extension of the time limits. The staff member was granted two weeks to file and serve a revised application.

Motion for extension of time was refused. Abuse of process of the Tribunal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT preliminarily rejected the Applicant¡¯s requests for recusal, holding that there were no longer any grounds for ruling on those requests since the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT President previously rejected those requests. Concerning the first application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that the Applicant did not establish the illegality of the election of JC and that his application for the election to be declared null and void must be rejected. With regard to the Applicant¡¯s request that all decisions taken by the Internal Justice Council be rescinded, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT held that it is clear from General Assembly Resolution 62/228 of 22 December...