Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ

Having considered the parties¡¯ submissions on the matter of the appropriate relief for the Applicant, the Tribunal: (i) Orders rescission of the decision to summarily dismiss the Applicant; (ii) Orders the Respondent to reinstate the Applicant; (iii) Orders the Respondent to make good the Applicant¡¯s lost earnings from the date of his summary dismissal to the date of his reinstatement with interest at 8% less US$ 2,600 per month for the said period; (iv) Orders that the Applicant be served a written reprimand to be filed in his Official Status File for the reasons cited at paragraph 8.1 (iii)...

Outcome: Appeal upheld. Decision held to be a breach of staff regulation 2.1 and the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. Respondent ordered to pay compensation of the difference in salary, allowances and other entitlements between the applicant¡¯s current level and the level at which she should have been classified since the date she made her request. Respondent ordered to pay compensation for non-material damage due to frustration and humiliation compounded by delays at six months¡¯ net base salary.

There was substantial impact on the applicant¡¯s life and work, which was both foreseeable and a direct result of the breach. Injury to career prospects: It is reasonable to infer that the applicant will probably be promoted in due course and that this prospect has been delayed by his failure to achieve the position in Geneva. This is economic loss. The court proceedings were burdensome, stressful, and time consuming, but this matter is inextricably involved with the denial, up to the judgment, of the applicant¡¯s rights, and will be sufficiently recompensed as part of the award for the breach...

In accordance with former staff rule 111.2 (a) (i), the Applicant had only one month as of the receipt of the Secretary-General¡¯s reply to submit an appeal to the JAB. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant received the reply to her request for review on 31 January 2008 and that the JAB received her appeal only on 31 March 2008. Hence, the Tribunal considered that the Applicant¡¯s appeal was late. The Tribunal examined the record of facts and concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed, which may justify a waiver of the time limits for the submission of the statement of appeal to the JAB...

The Tribunal noted that the case was one of the cases provided for under Section 4.2 of ST/SGB/2009/11 on transitional measures. At the outset, the Tribunal declared the application irreceivable with respect to any claim which had not been raised previously in the request for review to the Secretary-General. The Tribunal further raised ex officio the issue of the receivability ratione personae of the application since the decision not to select the Applicant to the post was taken when the Applicant was a former staff member. The Tribunal noted that article 3, paragraph 1 (b), of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Under the given circumstances, the application for an extension of time could not be considered as an application on the merits. No exceptional circumstances for an extension of time could be found. Lack of legal counsel normally does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Since the Applicant had learned one month before the end of the time limit that OSLA would not take her case, it was appropriate and reasonable for the Applicant to submit an application by herself within the time limits.

In cases deemed suitable to be decided by summary judgment, usually an oral hearing is not necessary. In non-disciplinary cases, it is a matter of judicial discretion to hold an oral hearing or to abstain from it. The mandate of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending...

The Tribunal cannot allow the Applicant¡¯s claim to continue to ¡°hang like the sword of Damocles¡± over the efficient operations of the Organization. The Applicant had failed to give instructions to his Counsel in respect of his Application. The Applicant¡¯s Counsel¡¯s responses show disregard for the directions from the Tribunal. The Applicant has not actively or diligently pursued his case.

The mandate of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT is confined to the review of administrative decisions. Although the definition of this term may be disputed, it is beyond question that administrative decisions must by essence be taken by the Administration. Since the decisions of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are judicial decisions, they cannot be contested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. The provisions on transitional measures apply to pending Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT cases only. They do not include the power to revise Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgements. Cases closed by judgments of former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT are res iudicata.

The Tribunal examined whether the application contained an administrative decision falling under the purview of Article 2.1 (a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The Tribunal took the view that the decision taken by the administration to appoint an ad interim DCPM and to reallocate responsibilities and duties pursuant to that appointment was an administrative decision. Nevertheless, for the purposes of Article 2.1 (a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the Tribunal stated that it is not sufficient for the Applicant to merely establish that an administrative decision was taken in the overall context of the position she...