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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that OIOS operates under the ¡°authority¡± of the Secretary-General but has ¡°operational independence¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that, insofar as the contents and procedures of an individual report are concerned, the Secretary-General has no power to influence or interfere with OIOS. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also has no jurisdiction to do so, as it can only review the Secretary-General¡¯s administrative decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT, however, noted that to the extent that any OIOS decisions are used to affect staff members¡¯ terms or contract of employment, OIOS¡¯ reports may be...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that Article 10. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute limits the total compensation awarded under subparagraphs (a) or (b), or both, to an amount that shall normally not exceed two years¡¯ net base salary of the applicant, unless the Tribunal orders the payment of higher compensation and gives the reasons for that decision. In cases where Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT rescinds an illegal decision to dismiss a staff member, the Administration must both reinstate the staff member and pay compensation for loss of salaries and entitlements. If the Administration elects to pay compensation in lieu of the performance of a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was satisfied that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that Ms Frechon was incapable of further service, based on the findings of the Medical Board, was not tantamount to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT having stepped into the shoes of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Medical Director. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there were no grounds to disagree with the finding of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Ms Frechon¡¯s contract was, in fact, terminated for medical reasons. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the procedure which should have been invoked was that set out in ST/AI/1999/16. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in rescinding the decision to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no gender discrimination took place against Ms Abbasi. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that there was gender discrimination against her. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration applied Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF¡¯s Gender Parity and Equality Policy in Ms Abbasi¡¯s favour. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find any violation of the right to be equally considered ¨C or even favoured for reasons of gender ¨C in the evaluation criteria applied or in the decisions taken by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF during the selection process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General and a cross-appeal by Mr Bertucci. Recalling that compensation in the absence of actual injury is without legal basis, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law. However, acceding in part to the cross-appeal by Mr Bertucci, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that when the disciplinary procedure does not bear out allegations against a staff member that may have been considered during a preliminary investigation, entitlements that may have been lawfully withheld pursuant to administrative instruction ST/AI/2004/3 must be paid in full, including interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the award...

The Appellant appealed the amount of compensation awarded for loss of chance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no set way for the trial court to set damages for loss of chance of promotion and that each case turned on its facts. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it would generally defer to the trial court¡¯s discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the Appellant¡¯s argument that the trial court was required to assess the percentage chances that he would have been selected: Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while it had approved that procedure as one method of assessing damages, it respected the opinion of the trial judge as to how to determine...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in its judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, at the time of receipt of his settlement offer, the time limit to file the application to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had already run for approximately three weeks and nothing prevented the Appellant from filing his application or applying for a waiver or extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exceptional suspension of time limits provided for under Article 8(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute and provisional Staff Rule 11. 1 applied only to informal dispute resolution conducted through the Office of the Ombudsman. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the settlement...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as a consequence of paragraph 11 of the Inter-Organisation Agreement, the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ, through Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAMID, undertook to extend the protection of its system of administration of justice to the Appellant in respect of administrative decisions taken by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAMID during the term of the Loan Agreement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that under this provision, the Appellant could only appeal against the administrative decisions of WFP before ILOAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, without access to the administration of justice system within the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ, the Appellant would have no right to an effective remedy from the competent tribunal in...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the reason given for the non-renewal of the Appellant¡¯s contract was a restructuring and that the Appellant conceded that the restructuring was properly done. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the opinion expressed by the Appellant¡¯s Chief, that his performance deficiencies and shortcomings could justify the non-renewal of his contract, was immaterial. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration provided the Appellant with legitimate reasons for the non-renewal of his appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in deciding to review the non-attribution issue separately from the other issues. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was receivable because Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had committed an error in procedure such as to affect the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal, annulled the judgment and remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for a de novo review.