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On appeal, the Appellant asserted that the Commissioner-General erred in not following the JAB¡¯s recommendation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB did not assess the totality of the evidence when making its recommendation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT specifically held that the JAB¡¯s recommendation that no clear policy or instruction prevented the Appellant from giving the individual the authorization to use the DSA Facility did not take into account that there was a clear policy to inform his supervisors, which the Appellant failed to do. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referenced the Shanks jurisprudence (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-026bis) where it held that the authority of a final judgment - res judicata - cannot be so readily set aside. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there are only limited grounds as enumerated in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute for review of a final judgment and an allegation of an error in law is not one of them. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application to set aside and remand the previous judgment.

In considering the Appellant¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the appeal was not receivable with respect to the issue of the Appellant¡¯s non-promotion during the 2004-2005 Annual Promotion Session as the issue was not raised before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in finding on the merits that the Appellant had not been subjected to harassment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was a proven record of considerable efforts deployed in order to resolve the Appellant¡¯s situation, involving the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR senior management at the highest level and that the High Commissioner personally met the Appellant and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Applicant¡¯s appeal was receivable because he was not notified of any written administrative decision on non-extension of his contract after 31 December 2007. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ignored that the time limit of two months, required by rule 111. 2(a), begins to run ¡°from the date the staff member received notification of the decision in writing. ¡± As the Applicant was never communicated any written administrative decision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in holding that the appeal was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT set aside Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment and remanded the case back to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to have the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT preliminarily denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing, determining that there was no need for further evidence, and then considered the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the minor errors in the promotion process prejudiced no one¡¯s rights, especially in that, while it is much better practice to do so, the Appellant cited no authority requiring the listing of the exact number of positions available in the vacancy announcement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also affirmed the findings of fact by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, including that the Appellant well knew the numbers of vacancies, and there was no individual prejudice to him in the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT stated that an Application for Interpretation is not receivable if its actual purpose is to have Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT re-examine its decision, even though its judgments are final and without appeal, or to have it comment on its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the applications made under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 30 of the appeal, with the purpose of either calling into question the decision or having Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT issue comments on the decision, were not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the use of the word ¡°annul¡± would not lead to confusion in the mind of a party in good faith because the language of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision on the suspension of action on an administrative is an exception to the general principle of law and must be narrowly interpreted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this exception can only be applied to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of implementation of an administrative decision when a management evaluation is ongoing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT exceeded its competence when it ordered the suspension of the present action until the judgment on the merits of the Appellant¡¯s...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Secretary-General. The Secretary-General contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by failing to recognize that the second contract by which Mr. Castelli¡¯s appointment was extended beyond a year was invalid because it had not been submitted for review by a central review body. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, unless it is fake or fraudulent, a staff member¡¯s appointment contract gives rise to entitlements upon the signing and acceptance by the staff member of their letter of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this is true even where the administration improperly handled the recruitment process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellants each failed to bring themselves under the exceptional circumstances provision of former Staff Rule 111. 2(f). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no legal difference between exceptional circumstances and exceptional cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a delay can generally be excused only because of circumstances beyond an Appellant¡¯s control. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no error in fact or in law was made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr James¡¯ appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that Mr James was not eligible for the P-3 position both because he did not take the required examination and because of the lack of required qualifications. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed Mr James¡¯ appeal that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in not awarding him compensation for loss of opportunity. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the cross-appeal and set aside the order for compensation for distress. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the compensation was not requested, there was no evidence of damage or injuries, and Mr James acknowledged on appeal...