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On the alleged procedural error of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT not allowing an oral examination of witnesses, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was well within the competence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to manage its cases as it saw fit and that the Appellant had not demonstrated how the procedure affected or violated her due process rights; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed this ground of appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, affirming the finding of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, that the Appellant failed to establish that the decision to remove her from her post in Budapest constituted a disguised disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the ground of appeal that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to consider that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision and an application for interpretation of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-112, both filed by Ms Abbasi. On the application for revision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it constituted a disguised way to criticise the impugned judgment or to disagree with it, noting that the rules did not allow the use of an application for revision for such a goal or to modify, complete or improve a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, even if the ¡°cheating¡± in the written test had been qualified as previously unknown and not due to Ms Abbasi¡¯s negligence, it would not have had a decisive impact on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Basenko¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the reference made by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to the precedent in Gabaldon (judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-139) could not be regarded as a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was unable to see any valid ground for revision within the purview of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-158. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no new fact such as to meet the criteria set out in Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker sought to re-argue or reopen issues. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that insofar as Mr Laeijendecker sought interpretation of the impugned judgment, paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 were clear on their face and had to be read in conjunction with paragraphs 27 and 28, and paragraphs 32-35. On the allegation of bias, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Laeijendecker¡¯s submissions amounted to no more than completely...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for interpretation by Mr Shkurtaj on the issue of interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Warren (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-059) and Mmata (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-092) for the holding that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the interest payable was at the US Prime Rate and that an extra five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate if the judgment was not executed within 60 days of its issuance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the date from which interest on the compensation was to be paid at the US Prime Rate was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-154. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the new evidence was irrelevant because the case was not receivable; neither Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT nor Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Sims¡¯ case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the application.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly stated that even if it could be argued that the profile of the Broadcast Technology Officer (BTO P-4) post had changed due to the drafting of new Terms of Reference (TOR) by Ms Hermann, the only viable course of action in the circumstances for the purposes of filling it would have been a regular, competitive selection process and not a comparative review as happened in this case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the so-called comparative review between Ms Hersh and Mr Tobgyal for the only post...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Terragnolo¡¯s cross-appeal, noting that only the compensation awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was being contested. With respect to the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the specific remedy of allowing Mr Terragnolo to take the examination was not available and therefore, subsidiary compensation was the appropriate remedy to be ordered. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the impugned judgment followed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT¡¯s jurisprudence, but Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s estimation of the loss of chance was absurd or contrary to the evidence and particular circumstances of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that due...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed Ms Guzman¡¯s Motion to file an Addendum to Answer the Secretary-General¡¯s Appeal, after finding that the material she wished to submit was more properly suited for a hearing on the merits and was not germane to the issue being reviewed by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the contested decision was not affected by the exclusionary provision of Article 10(2) of its Statute and Article 14 of its Rules of Procedure was not supported by the contents of Ms Guzman¡¯s amended Motion of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 233, which contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in issuing an order as there was no matter for adjudication after Ms Chocobar withdrew her application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in making its Order in the absence of a case to adjudicate, lacked jurisdiction and exceeded its competence to a significant degree. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 36 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP did not provide a legal basis for the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order, as there was no case before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to which Article 36 could apply. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Article 36 does not allow Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to...