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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT previously addressed the issues at hand and, therefore, there were no grounds to consider that the Appellant¡¯s rights to due process were violated by a judgment by default or by not considering her arguments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in concluding that there was no administrative decision concerning the Appellant¡¯s return to the G-4 post capable of judicial review under Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, as that return was the predictable and logical consequence of her non-selection. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT relied on its holding in Zhang (2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-078) and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the contentions against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2009/004 were not receivable since only appeals against judgments on merits are receivable. Regarding the contentions against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/080, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no need to produce further documents. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly applied Article 10. 5 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute in ordering compensation in lieu and that the Appellant had no right to request Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to order his reinstatement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the non-renewal was based on a tainted performance evaluation and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, therefore, ordered the rescission of the...

The Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Cabrera¡¯s cross-appeal centred on the issue of whether placing a staff member on SLWFP violates their due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in this case, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT created a new class of special leave, where the staff member was actually suspended with full pay. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not agree with the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the Office of Internal Oversight Services¡¯ investigation was not a preliminary investigation, as Mr Cabrera was put on leave using all the reasons under which he could be suspended. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Noting the absence of a written record, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not confirm if the procedure under Article 17 (Oral Evidence) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP was complied with, whether the witnesses made a declaration under Article 17(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP before giving their statements, or whether the witnesses were cross-examined by the opposing party under Article 17(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT set aside the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for a fresh hearing based on the pleadings already on record in a matter consistent with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal, in which the Appellant contended that exceptional circumstances existed that would merit a waiver of the time limit, allowing his application to be admitted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in such an instance, it is the applicant¡¯s responsibility to convince the tribunal of such circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant did not overcome this hurdle before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting the Appellant¡¯s contentions that he had exceptional circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the Appellant¡¯s reliance on erroneous advice...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in finding that the statement dated 26 November 2003 was neither a decision to terminate the Appellant¡¯s appointment nor a disciplinary measure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the statement was merely a publicly stated opinion which had no legal consequences on the Appellant who, in addition to having already been informed on 29 October 2003 that his contract would not be renewed beyond 30 November 2003, had also declared that he would not be able or willing to continue working for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵODC after his contract expired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Comerford-Verzuu¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal, regarding whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct in holding that the contested decision was dated 2 August 2005 and that the request for administrative review was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the OIOS reply of 2 August 2005 was the administrative decision of which Ms Comerford-Verzuu was seeking a review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the subsequent correspondence was unwarranted and did not extend the time limit for seeking administrative review of the first administrative order. Accordingly, the time limit for seeking administrative...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, in agreement with the Secretary-General, agreed that there were no grounds to award compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no administrative decision being contested in this case, as both parties accepted the decision to promote Ms Kamal and she had not identified any illegality that could lead to an award of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the delay in completing the selection process could not be considered a valid ground for compensation, since the circumstances of the case did not show any negligence or violation of specific...

The Secretary-General appealed and Mr Marsh filed a cross-appeal, challenging the legality of the interview process and the compensation award. With respect to the first issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the records showed a proper and professional proceeding during the interviews and the report of its outcome was based on evaluations objectively motivated, and Mr Marsh was accorded the objective consideration and equal treatment to which all candidates are entitled. With respect to the second issue, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that not every violation of due process will necessarily lead to an award of compensation...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, contrary to the Appellant¡¯s contention, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not required to ascertain whether the closure of the Centre was a consequence of mismanagement or of any other factor since the primary purpose was not to get rid of the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not fail to exercise its jurisdiction by not ascertaining whether the closure of the Centre was the result of serious mismanagement and irregularities. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found that the Appellant failed to submit sufficiently clear and convincing evidence that the desire to retaliate against him...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal, in which the Appellant claimed that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed procedural errors in allowing the Secretary-General to embark on a de novo fact-finding inquiry and that the disciplinary measure of separation was disproportionate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was within the competence of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to hold oral hearings as well as to order the production of evidence for fair and expeditious disposal of the proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Administration bears the burden of establishing that the alleged misconduct, for which a disciplinary measure has been taken against a staff member, occurred and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate that the contested decision had adverse effects on his terms and conditions of employment, in particular his health insurance and benefits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had brought no relevant arguments to challenge Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that there was no administrative decision within Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s jurisdiction being contested. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against the judgment on the merits (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/054) and two further appeals by both the Secretary-General and the Applicant of the judgment on compensation (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/131). Relying on its previous holding in Bertucci (2011/Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT/114), Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that the Administration violated the Applicant¡¯s due process rights, as no actual prejudice was found. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the established facts, as admitted by the Applicant, clearly demonstrated that he engaged in the sexual harassment of local employees and used his position of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly stated that the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal considered and rejected all of the Appellant¡¯s other pleas and that for this reason, the matter of interest was res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered the Secretary-General to make a payment of USD 25,000 as compensation for the excessive and inordinate delays and the emotional harm and to arrange for a Medical Board to consider outstanding invoices. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that, as the Secretary-General did not appeal, he had therefore accepted the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision and financial award. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Worsley¡¯s appeal and the Secretary-General¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence that OSLA¡¯s decision to not represent Ms Worsley was based on her disability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ms Worsley did not show how OSLA¡¯s actions affected her rights or her case, as she was simply repeating arguments that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT previously considered in its judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment with regard to its decision that the right of staff members to receive assistance from OSLA does not amount to a right to be represented by OSLA.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no valid claim of unfair treatment and discrimination by the Appellant against the former Chief of ATS and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT therefore correctly limited its consideration to the interview process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant was merely repeating arguments that were adequately considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and that there were no reasons to reverse Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Appellant contested the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that he was afforded full and fair consideration for the position of Chief and argued that he suffered unfair and discriminatory treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the Administration does not comply with a Tribunal¡¯s order to disclose the reasons for an administrative decision, as such, the Tribunal cannot automatically conclude that the decision was arbitrary, but it is entitled to draw an adverse inference from the refusal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the Administration¡¯s decision must be deemed unlawful, as the Secretary-General refused to comply...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal limited to the claim that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered inadequate compensation for the losses he sustained as a result of various acts and omissions on the part of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT took due regard for the arguments the Appellant brought in his appeal and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, having regarded the parameters of what it could compensate the Appellant for, made adequate provisions for the Appellant¡¯s economic and social losses in its overall award to him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both the Secretary-General and M Akyeampong on the issue of whether Ms Akyeampong could be denied a promotion on account of the two reprimands. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the two reprimands had not been an obstacle to Ms Akyeampong filling a D-1 position or being recommended for a promotion. Moreover, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the presence of the two reprimands had not debarred her from being promoted during the 2009 annual promotion session. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed Ms Akyeampong¡¯s appeal in part, rescinded the impugned decision and dismissed the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal, with Judge Weinberg de...