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The Respondent submitted that the application was not receivable as the decision of 31 August 2011 was a reiteration of the decision given to the Applicant on 30 March 2009, before Sprauten Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/094. The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the decision of 31 August 2011 was made, or should have been made, pursuant to the directions and order of the Tribunal in Sprauten Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/094 (see paras. 87¨C88), and it thus cannot be viewed as a mere reiteration of the decision dated 30 March 2009. The purpose of the Tribunal¡¯s order in para. 87 of Sprauten Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/094 was to direct the Administration to make a new...

The Applicants have withdrawn the matter in finality, including on the merits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT dismissed the application in its entirety without liberty to reinstate.

Receivability: The Tribunal considered whether it has the requisite jurisdiction to make a determination on an application for interpretation of an order as opposed to a final judgment. Noting that: (i) there is no provision in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute or Rules of Procedure governing interpretation of orders or expressly prohibiting interpretation of a decision that is labeled ¡°Order¡±; and (ii) that regardless of whether decisions on applications for suspension of action are labeled as orders or judgments, they determine substantial issues, the Tribunal, pursuant to articles 19 and 36 of the Rules of...

The Tribunal found that art. 17 does not refer to an evaluation by a medical practitioner selected by the Administration in cases of requests for reconsideration and that the Administration failed to follow the correct procedure when it did not convene a medical board. It further noted that the Administration could not, under art. 17, use an independent medical evaluation by a practitioner established in the framework of the initial assessment of a disability benefit under the Pension Fund Regulations. The Tribunal further stressed that the independent medical evaluation failed to address the...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found that the Respondent¡¯s argument that no promise had been made was untenable. The evidence clearly indicated that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS Managers knew the Applicant would rely on the statements they made to her in regards to a one year contract extension. The Respondent repeatedly disregarded its own rules and regulations in the course of completing the Applicant¡¯s performance appraisal and subsequently conducted a flawed rebuttal process which was biased and unfair and violated the Applicant¡¯s due process rights. Promises made created expectancy of renewal - It is untenable for the Administration...

The Applicant contests OSLA's decisions of 5 November 2013 not to represent him in two of the cases he had at the time pending at the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the application was receivable. It rejected the application on the merits, on the grounds that the decisions constituted a legal exercise of discretion on the part of OSLA, which had provided the Applicant with extensive legal assistance, had carefully considered all the issues and gave valid reasons on why it would not represent the Applicant. The Tribunal further found that the Applicant failed to provide evidence that OSLA...

The Tribunal found that the Applicant did not timely submit his request for management evaluation. Additionally, the Tribunal found that the Applicant failed to identify in clear and precise terms specific administrative decision(s), actions or omissions, including their dates. Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that the application was not receivable, ratione materiae.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 233, which contended that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in issuing an order as there was no matter for adjudication after Ms Chocobar withdrew her application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in making its Order in the absence of a case to adjudicate, lacked jurisdiction and exceeded its competence to a significant degree. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Article 36 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP did not provide a legal basis for the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order, as there was no case before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to which Article 36 could apply. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Article 36 does not allow Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Das¡¯s application for Interpretation of judgment with respect to the award of interest on the compensatory damages and any remaining termination benefits and entitlements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that its earlier jurisprudence held that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement becomes due, which in this case is the date of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it had merely affirmed the award of compensatory damages and termination benefits by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and had not initiated it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit to the Secretary-General¡¯s claim that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered motions seeking execution of four judgments (judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-357, judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359, judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-358, and judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-360). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied these motions, noting that execution did occur in each of the cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that payment of the moral damages had been effected and a new conversion process had been completed, thus, none of the applications merited an order for execution pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and Article 27 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT RoP. With respect to Ademagic et al. and Mr Longone¡¯s motion to hold decision letters in...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Gakumba¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-387. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not fulfil the statutory requirements and was seemingly disguised as an attempt to re-open the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would be manifestly unreasonable to submit that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP Conversion Policy issued in 2010 could not be argued by the staff member in 2012 before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, or in 2013 before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no valid reason had been provided about the untimely submission of the application for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing and considered his grounds of appeal. With respect to the claimed errors of procedure, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit in the Appellant¡¯s arguments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded that the Appellant suffered prejudice by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT admitting the Commissioner-General¡¯s late reply, failing to translate the reply into Arabic, failing to lift the confidentiality order, or by failing to hold an oral hearing. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the Appellant had an unhealthy working relationship with...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by concluding that ST/AI/2002/3 applied to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF, as the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF Handbook establishes the procedure that a staff member must follow should they wish to rebut the content of their performance report. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the principle articulated in Villamoran v. Secretary-General of the United Nations (2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-160), which holds that administrative issuances have greater legal authority over manuals such as the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF Handbook, only where there is a conflict between guidelines and manuals and a properly promulgated...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/145. On the issue of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in not receiving the Appellant¡¯s application for revision of judgment, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that to import into Article 12(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute the limitations presently advocated by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, merely because of the inclusion of the word ¡°executable,¡± would be unduly restrictive and tantamount to a denial of an already narrowly construed remedy and unduly circumscribe the right of access of staff members to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. With respect to the merits of the application for revision, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal as to whether Ms Carrabregu was eligible to be considered for a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the factual sequence clearly showed that Ms Carrabregu freely and willingly resigned from her service with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP to take up an appointment with a different entity (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵV), thereby causing a break in service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this break in service should have led Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to uphold the administrative decision that Ms Carrabregu was not eligible for conversion to a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Ms Carrabregu¡¯s service to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵV could not be...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT then considered the Appellant¡¯s claims that the facts were not established by clear and convincing evidence, that there were procedural flaws during the disciplinary proceedings, and that his separation from service was not warranted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that clear and convincing evidence showed that the Appellant harassed all the alleged victims and abused his authority, in violation of WFP¡¯s Harassment Policy. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that the sanction of separation from service was proportionate...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not succeed in establishing any error of fact or law which would warrant the reversal of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that the termination of the Appellant¡¯s appointment was firmly supported by the evidence relative to the necessities of service in the context of a downsizing exercise, and no bias or improper purpose vitiated the impugned decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant did not effectively rebut the conclusions of the impugned judgment, he did not satisfy the burden of demonstrating that it was defective such as to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal limited to the Appellant¡¯s claim that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in awarding costs against him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the jurisdiction of a tribunal to award costs is narrowly restricted to instances where a party has manifestly abused the proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT gave no reasons for its determination that the Appellant had manifestly abused the proceedings, cited no evidence establishing that his application was frivolous or vexatious, or that he had deliberately delayed the proceedings, or had disobeyed an order of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT or had, in any other way, abused Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not succeed in establishing any error of fact or law that would warrant reversal of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that the non-selection of the Appellant was not vitiated by any improper motive. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, even if the alleged flaws were to be considered irregularities, they would not be important enough to render the proceedings null or to reflect a violation of rights and actual harm or discrimination suffered by the Appellant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no compensation should be awarded to the Appellant, as no illegality or breach of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s submission that she let the deadline elapse primarily because she was confused by the first sentence of the message she received from the Office of the Deputy High Commissioner. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that this circumstance was previously considered by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was satisfied that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s pronouncement was in accordance with the established case law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the appeal.