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The decision by the Chief of the Human Resources Services Section (HRSS) to discontinue the selection process without a proper determination that the recruitment procedures had not been followed precisely was an abuse of the Administration¡¯s discretionary authority. While the Applicant had only been ¡°recommended¡± for the post by the ASP and had not been ¡°selected¡±, the serious procedural irregularity that resulted from the Chief of HRSS¡¯ actions prevented his candidacy from proceeding to the central review body and therefore amounted to a violation of his rights. The decision was an abuse of...

Out of the various decisions that the applicant challenged, only those raised in the request for administrative request are receivable. Mere preparatory decisions may not be contested before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1, of its statute. Indeed, those decisions are not of such nature as to affect the staff member¡¯s rights per se; they can be called into question in contesting the main/final decision, but not by themselves. Furthermore, since the applicant had already been promoted by the time he filed the present case, he had no legitimate interest to take legal action.

The Head of Office acted within his authority in effectively overriding the recommendation of the APC, as provided for by Annex 4G, para. 28(a)(iii). The relationship between the SAP and the APC is sequential, not hierarchical; the judgment of one is not superior to the judgment of the other. The Head of Office is not bound to accept the recommendation of one over the other. The Head of Office is bound to exercise his independent judgment after giving careful consideration to the recommendations made to him and explaining why he preferred one candidate to another. The Head of Office did not...

Since the applicant did not comply with the time limits prescribed in former staff rule 111.2 (a), the Tribunal examined whether there were any exceptional circumstances within the meaning of former staff rule 111.2 (f) which prevented her from submitting a request for review in time.The Tribunal applied the definition of exceptional circumstances adopted by the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and upheld by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in a number of judgments, i.e. circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. Outcome: The application was rejected as time-barred.

The applicant, then a staff member, applied and was short-listed for the Galaxy-advertised post of ASG/DESA. The notice stated that the candidacies of all Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff members were to be ¡°considered first¡±, that is to say, in priority to external candidates, and via a procedure akin to that of ST/AI/2006/3. The person appointed was not a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ staff member and the applicant challenged the decision to appoint them. At around the time of the applicant¡¯s application for the post, he was the subject of various widely publicized investigations. The respondent initially claimed that the decision not to...

The application was withdrawn by the Applicant in light of a settlement agreement.

Since the applicant was not a staff member of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOV when the contested decision was taken, the decision to bar him from access to the VIC did not affect and could not have affected his terms of appointment. The decision could be contested neither before the JAB nor before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT.

ST/AI/292, dated 15 July 1982, provides measures in relation to the filing of adverse materials in personnel records, which measures were supposed to be interim in nature. In the context of the current framework of norms, ST/AI/292 alone does not provide adequate ¡°rebuttal¡± procedures for short-term staff. The creation of two classes of short-term staff which potentially occurs via ST/AI/2002/3, based on management discretion is not fair; where the provisions of ST/AI/2002/3 are applied to some short-term staff and not others, this violates the doctrine of equal treatment in like circumstances...

The contested decision was linked to the decision to bar the applicant from entering the VIC in October 1999, when he was no longer a staff member of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOV. Hence, the decision to deny his counsel access to the applicant¡¯s OSF did not affect and could not have affected his terms of appointment. The application was thus neither receivable before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT nor before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Outcome: The application was rejected.

The contested decision did not affect the applicant¡¯s terms of appointment derived from his status as a former staff member or from his status as a retiree. Furthermore, there is not a contractual relationship between the applicant and the Organization derived from his voluntary service as a member of the Panel of Counsel. The application was thus neither receivable before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT nor before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Outcome: The application was rejected.

Articles 2(1) and 2(1) (a) of the Statute of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT define a contract of employment to include ¡°all pertinent regulations and rules and all relevant administrative issuances in force at the time of the alleged non-compliance. There is nothing before the Tribunal to evidence that the Applicant signed any LOA in relation to the offer made by the organization to employ him on the terms defined in the reassignment memorandum dated 10 June 2008. The reassignment memorandum contained terms that were not certain, that were qualified and cannot therefore besaid to have been a final and binding...

In its findings, the Tribunal found that the evidence in support of the charges was credible and that the Applicant failed to prove that the decision to summarily dismiss him was arbitrary or motivated by prejudice or other extraneous factors, or was flawed by procedural irregularities or error of law. With regards to the Applicant¡¯s allegations of breach of due process, the Tribunal could not find any evidence that the rights of the Applicant had been violated. The Tribunal was also satisfied that the Respondent discharged his burden of proof and that he made proper use of his discretion.

The applicant was ordered to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for want of prosecution by a prescribed time, and failed to do so. There being a failure of prosecution, the matter must be dismissed, as the applicant shows not interest in maintaining proceedings.Outcome: The application was dismissed in its entirety for want of prosecution.

Outcome: For distress: USD5,000. For loss of chance: (a) 10 percent of the difference between the salary the applicant actually carries and that she would have received in the D-2 position on a continuous basis, (b) 10 percent of any additional allowances and benefits she would have received at the D-2 level including adjustment of her pension contributions and consequent retirement benefits.

Since the applicant, in a timely manner, addressed his requests to competent officials within the former system of internal justice and followed the advice received from them, it was beyond his control that he did not file his request for administrative review within the time limits; therefore, exceptional circumstances are given. In view of the provision of the letter of appointment quoted above, no termination was possible without keeping a thirty days notice period. The decision to terminate the appointment with immediate effect is in noncompliance with the applicant¡¯s terms of appointment...

Outcome: Application dismissed, but award of a nominal compensation of USD 1,000 for procedural deficiencies in the selection process.

Outcome: The applicant is not entitled to have the note removed simply because no disciplinary proceedings were undertaken in respect of the investigation report. However, the note in its present form is inaccurate and must be removed. Its replacement, if any, must be accurate and first shown to the applicant, who must be given a copy of the investigation report to enable him to place such comment on the file as he wishes, providing it is reasonably connected to the investigation.

Outcome: Appeal upheld. Decision held to be a breach of staff regulation 2.1 and the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. Respondent ordered to pay compensation of the difference in salary, allowances and other entitlements between the applicant¡¯s current level and the level at which she should have been classified since the date she made her request. Respondent ordered to pay compensation for non-material damage due to frustration and humiliation compounded by delays at six months¡¯ net base salary.

The Applicant withdrew her application and therefore Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT closed the proceedings.

In his request for review to the Secretary-General, the Applicant contested the decision not to appoint him to the post of Chief (D-1), Information and Communication Technology Division, at ESCWA. Subsequently, in his appeal to the JAB, the Applicant sought to contest several other decisions. The only decision that the Tribunal is competent to examine is the decision for which administrative review was sought. The evaluation of candidates to a post falls within the discretion of the Secretary-general and the Tribunal will not substitute its views to that of the Secretary-General. However, as...