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The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s appointment was lawfully terminated under staff regulation 9.3(a)(i) following the termination of MINUSMA¡¯s mandate. The Tribunal found that there is no basis for the Applicant¡¯s claim that the Administration unlawfully terminated his appointment early because of his health. The Tribunal found that the Applicant¡¯s reliance on ST/AI/2019 and ST/AI/1999/16 was misguided since his appointment was not terminated on health grounds.

Whether the application is receivable in its entirety Although the Applicant questioned the legality of the threshold to qualify for a single parent allowance, contained in sec. 4.4 of ST/AI/2018/6, it must be understood as part of his legal reasoning or arguments and cannot be considered as the ¡°contested decision¡± as suggested by the Respondent. Indeed, the Applicant does not claim in the abstract that the requirement contained in sec. 4.4 of ST/AI/2018/6 is unlawful but rather seeks to challenge the direct and individual application of the specific requirement to his case as it adversely...

There was no express indication that the Judgment of the 11th Judicial Circuit Court was executable upon issuance, neither was the issue investigated by the administration in the proceedings leading to the impugned decision. Rather, pertinent documents focus on the finality, apparently presumed from the title ¡®Final judgment of dissolution of marriage¡¯. The title should not have been relied upon. The contested decision was not based on a court order whose enforceability was unequivocal. The Tribunal did not find any indication of the judgment by the Third District Court of Appeal of the State...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and fact in ordering the refund of the recovery of the overpayments for two months. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ms Ten Have was aware of the overpayment in April 2013 and therefore, the general rule of Section 3. 1 of ST/AI//2009/1 was applicable and the recovery of the two months overpayments was not excessive since the limit of two years could not be applied due to the staff member¡¯s awareness of the overpayments as of April 2013, regardless of her previous ignorance or bona fide. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that as no request for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by considering as mitigating factors the recommendation of Mr Jaffa¡¯s immediate supervisors that his actions warranted a reprimand and the fact that Mr Jaffa continued to perform for two further years (with positive reviews). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in not attaching sufficient importance to the fact that Mr Jaffa held a position of trust as a Finance Assistant. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General had not overlooked relevant mitigating factors in imposing the sanction of separation from service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals by both Mr Aliko and the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that Mr Aliko¡¯s application contesting the decision refusing his request to change nationality for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ purposes was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting as not receivable Mr Aliko¡¯s claims against the decisions on his ineligibility for education grant and on education grant recovery. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was lawful for the Administration to use Mr Aliko¡¯s pending entitlements to recover part of his indebtedness to the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal by the Secretary-General challenging the compensation for moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was enough evidence produced that the amount of compensation for moral damages had been paid into the staff member¡¯s bank account. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the payment of the compensation constituted an acceptance of the Secretary-General of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was, therefore, moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the staff member¡¯s claim for costs against the Secretary-General because of abuse of process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that although the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal had no merit, it...

On the matter of the deduction of 7,000 Euros paid to the Appellant¡¯s ex-wife from his final emoluments, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding that the Appellant¡¯s application was not receivable ratione materiae, although for different reasons than those given by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant filed his request for management evaluation outside of the time limit and that therefore his application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was clear from the facts that the Appellant knew and had expressly accepted that this payment to his ex-wife would be deducted from his final...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT misapplied the law of mootness and erred in law in reaching the impugned Judgment, in that it omitted to follow an important passage in Kallon relating to the cautious approach in applying the law of mootness.

The Tribunal examined whether the two-year limitation for the recovery of the overpayment as stated in ST/AI/2009/1 applied to the case at hand. While it was undisputed that the overpayment resulted from an error on the part of the Organization, the Tribunal found that the Applicant could not seriously claim that she was unaware or that she could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the overpayment, and it therefore concluded that the two- year limitation could not apply to her.