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In the present case, according to the Applicant¡¯s own submissions, he was not in a situation of ¡°an absolute impossibility¡± of filing a timely waiver as per Karki. Instead, while apparently being aware of expiry of the deadline, he continued to work intensely on preparing the application, and rather than giving priority to filing it in time, he instead wanted it ¡°to be perfect¡±. When then filing the application, the Applicant, however, made no reference to it being filed too late or indicating that he requested a waiver of the 90-day deadline under art. 8.3 of the Statute. He only requested a...

The Tribunal rejected the application as not receivable ratione materiae as (1) the record indicates that the Applicant did not submit a request for request for management evaluation to the Management Advice and Evaluation Section as required under staff rule 11.2; and (2) the contested decision had no direct effect on the Applicant, no external legal effect, nor any adverse impact on the Applicant¡¯s contractual employment rights.

The Court found that the Applicant failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances or factors beyond his control that prevented him from filing a timely application for enforcement of the Settlement Agreement (see, e.g., Gelsei 2020-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-1035, paras. 19-24).

In any event, the Trtibunal considered that a period of six and a half years to request enforcement was excessive.

The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine this application on the merits as it challenges a decision that was not submitted for management evaluation in a timely manner. The application is therefore not receivable ratione materiae.

The Applicant¡¯s contention in respect of his putative privileges and immunities as a staff member of the United Nations is misconceived. Section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is clear: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the...

Regarding claim 1, the Tribunal held that based on the evidence on record, the Applicant did not provide any evidence that could prove any form of misconduct against the OIOS or Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵIFIL officials who handled his complaint. Accordingly, claim 1 was rejected.

For claim 2, the Tribunal noted that, upon his request, via emails dated 22 August 2024 and 31 October 2024, the OIOS provided the Applicant with an explanation for the closure of his Complaint without investigation. Therefore, claim 2 was found to be moot.

Claim 3 was found not receivable. The Tribunal held that the outcome of a management...

The Tribunal found that the 29 February 2024 decision constituted a fresh administrative decision and not a mere reiteration of the 9 August 2023 decision as argued by the Respondent.

Just as a staff member may not reset the clock by repeatedly questioning the original decision, the Organization may not freeze the clock and deprive a staff member of their right to a new decision based on new circumstances.

The substantive issue in this case was whether the Administration properly exercised its discretion in not granting the Applicant telecommuting arrangements. The Tribunal found that the...

The Tribunal noted that the evidence before it, supplied by the Applicant himself, showed that the contested decision was taken on 17 April 2011 and the Application was filed in 2025.

Based on art. 8.1(d)(ii) of its Statute, the Tribunal found that the application was manifestly time-barred. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the application was not receivable ratione temporis and the application was rejected.

The Tribunal ordered the parties to produce consolidated lists of agreed and disputed facts to enable it understand the factual issues at stake.

The Tribunal also ordered the parties to indicate what additional documentaton they requested to be disclosed, and the identities of any witnesses they wished to call, specifying what disputed facts the witnesses would testify about.

The applicable rule stipulates that an application for interim measures during the proceedings must not concern appointment, promotion or termination. As this was clearly a case where the motion for interim measures concerned appointment, the temporary relief set out in art.14 was unavailable to the Applicant.

Accordingly, the motion for interim measures during the proceedings was rejected.

In any case, the Tribunal noted that the contested decision had already been implemented as the Applicant had been separated from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵHCR.

As the Applicant filed the application before the Dispute Tribunal almost two months after the decision to include his name in the ClearCheck database was implemented, the application for suspension of action was therefore not receivable.