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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not shown that the Secretary-General of IMO was required, under the IMO staff regulations and the staff rules, to make available to a federation of international staff associations from different organisations an IMO staff member, who was elected to a high office, for all or part of the term. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the reference in the appeal to Staff Rule 108. 1, concerning election, composition, and competencies of the staff committee, did not apply in the case. As to the question of inter-agency cost-sharing, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could only establish that this had to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that the determination made by the Programme OiC, namely that the application for sabbatical leave should not be forwarded to the Committee, was not within the Programme OiC¡¯s power. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly concluded that the decision made by the Programme OiC was in breach of the Appellant¡¯s terms of employment ¡°specifically, his right to have his application forwarded to the Committee and the [Assistant Secretary-General], OHRM¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had properly observed that an ¡°incomplete application may therefore be one which is missing...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no dispute that the Appellant was designated by the Director of OCHA Geneva as Officer-in-Charge (OiC) of the Financial and Administrative Unit, following the reassignment of the holder of the post (a P-5 post) to other functions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had properly determined that the transfer of the P-5 holder ¡°with his post¡¯¡¯ had the effect that there remained no ¡°vacant¡¯¡¯ or ¡°temporarily vacant¡¯¡¯ post against which the Appellant, albeit performing the functions of the post holder, could point to for the purposes of making the case for payment of a SPA. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in fact or law in its determination that the applicable Information Circular did not entitle the Appellant to an EOSA, nor was it contrary to a higher legal norm. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the facts of the case showed that her resignation did not fulfil the conditions required by the quoted circular. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT specifically noted how the resignation was taken knowing the risks involved and caused the break in service, which determined the ineligibility for collecting the allowance claimed for, acknowledging that the Appellant was requesting an exception from the regulations to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s interpretation process, which led to the dismissal of the claim, was neither unreasonable nor unfair. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the affirmation that only the purchasing power element of comparison would allow an equal pay and treatment of staff members constituted only a postulation of a certain parameter among many possible options, without real support except in terms of policy selection because other criteria could also allow that kind of equal treatment, provided that they are applied in a general and non-discriminating way. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the comparator element adopted in the...

The Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Cabrera¡¯s cross-appeal centred on the issue of whether placing a staff member on SLWFP violates their due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in this case, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT created a new class of special leave, where the staff member was actually suspended with full pay. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not agree with the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the Office of Internal Oversight Services¡¯ investigation was not a preliminary investigation, as Mr Cabrera was put on leave using all the reasons under which he could be suspended. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly stated that the former Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Administrative Tribunal considered and rejected all of the Appellant¡¯s other pleas and that for this reason, the matter of interest was res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ordered the Secretary-General to make a payment of USD 25,000 as compensation for the excessive and inordinate delays and the emotional harm and to arrange for a Medical Board to consider outstanding invoices. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that, as the Secretary-General did not appeal, he had therefore accepted the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision and financial award. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the payment of interest awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT on the payment of Mr Ahmed¡¯s accrued vacation days was undue, noting that any delay in the separation formalities was entirely attributable to him and, as such, he could not be compensated for the delay in payment. On the compensation in lieu of notice, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and held that the matter was properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and could not be construed as res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Administration made a commitment to pay Mr Ahmed compensation in lieu of notice and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that the placement of the Appellant on SLWOP enabled him to preserve his pension benefits, granted him the opportunity of remaining a staff member for the purpose of applying as an internal candidate for other positions, and made his relocation possible. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no abuse of authority or deliberate attempt to harm, as argued by the Appellant, but rather the Organisation adopted a protective approach. Noting that, due to the downsizing exercise related to the Appellant¡¯s post and his reassignment, he was not entitled to SLWFP and his...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there had been a policy change in 1997 which meant that staff members who requested pension as a result of an accident suffered in the service of the Organisation post-1997 were granted it with the proviso that it would only be paid until they retired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as the Appellant¡¯s accident occurred long after the policy change in 1997, the changed policy was applicable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant had reached retirement age at the time of the incapacitating injury, his appeal had to be dismissed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.