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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion to file an additional pleading in the absence of any exceptional circumstances warranting it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to seek leave from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT to introduce additional evidence and neither adduced evidence that exceptional circumstances warranted it nor that it would serve the interests of justice or the efficient and expeditious resolution of the appeal. On the issue of execution of the 2016 Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence that any of the orders contained therein were not executed and therefore the application was not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion to file additional pleadings on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the filing. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT calculation of the three-time periods of participation in the contributory health insurance plan was not correct. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even the correct calculation did not result in the required 10 years of participation, but only 9 years, 10 months, and 14 days. Turning to consider the period of 11 May to 30 June 2009, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a staff member who had expressly conceded in her application that a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not exceed its competence when assessing whether the decision to convene a medical board was lawful. The decision to convene a Medical Board five months after the service-incurred-injury in order to examine his fitness for continued service was reasonable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in deciding that the decision to convene a medical board less than five months after the Appellant¡¯s service-incurred injury was unlawful. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law and exceeded its competence by challenging the authority of the Medical Board¡¯s conclusion without clear and convincing medical evidence, by placing...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by Ms. Patkar. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant's argument that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in fact, law or failed to exercise its jurisdiction in concluding that the Appellant had not been granted sick leave that was then terminated or retracted. The MSD email to the Appellant concerned an evaluation of her fitness to work based on the medical report she had submitted and there was no evidence that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS Administration had approved such leave. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that that the Appellant¡¯s entitlement to sick leave did not outlive the expiration of the fixed-term appointment as...

The evidence and submissions on record are insufficient to determine the material issue as to whether the Appellant¡¯s claim for compensation totaled less than, or in excess of, USD 25,000, in order to determine the authority of the Secretary of the ABCC to take the contested administrative decision. Hence the remand to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to determine whether the Secretary of the ABCC had the valid power to take the contested decision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law by not taking account of evidence implying strongly that there had been an administrative decision by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA not to pay allowances to those who claimed them as their entitlement, and therefore concluding wrongly that there was no evidence of an administrative decision affecting the Appellant¡¯s rights. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s Judgment dismissing the Appellant¡¯s claim had to be upheld on grounds of lateness of their request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Judgment.

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in fact in concluding that the ABCC had solely and exclusively rested upon the MSD¡¯s medical report, and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its competence in stating that the time limit under Article 12 of Appendix D would only start to run from the moment when the psychological symptoms were so severe that the patient acknowledged that his/her syndrome no longer allowed him/her to fulfill his/her professional obligations. In the light of the facts that the Applicant was able to return to his high level of functioning at work after he had been transferred out of HATIS on 1 December 2013, that...

Contrary to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding, Mr. Kollie¡¯s letter of 7 June 2007 to the ABCC cannot be regarded as a request under Article 17 of the Appendix D to convene a medical board and reconsider the Secretary-General¡¯s decision. Nor can the emails of 25/27 July 2017 and 24 August 2017 be regarded as a review of the 16 May 2017 decision of the Secretary-General or an administrative decision under Article 2(1)(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. The emails of 25/27 July 2017 constituted an implied appealable decision by the ABCC to reject Mr. Kollie¡¯s claim for reimbursement of his out-of-pocket expenses. But...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that while the SAB may satisfy the requirements of a neutral first instance process, its decision is only advisory or recommendatory. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the facts did not disclose whether the Secretary-General of IMO had the power to amend the powers of the SAB retrospectively to permit the SAB to make a decision rather than a recommendation or, more pertinently, by subsequent fiat, to convert a recommendation of SAB into a decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the source of the Secretary-General¡¯s power to introduce interim measures was not clear and that there may be other constraints upon his...

The Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err when it found that Mustafa et al. had been informed of the impugned decision to deny a request to set their grade level at Grade 14 on 19 March 2018. Neither did it err when it found that the applications were not receivable, because the requests for decision review were submitted after the deadline.