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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered motions seeking execution of four judgments (judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-357, judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359, judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-358, and judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-360). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied these motions, noting that execution did occur in each of the cases. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that payment of the moral damages had been effected and a new conversion process had been completed, thus, none of the applications merited an order for execution pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and Article 27 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT RoP. With respect to Ademagic et al. and Mr Longone¡¯s motion to hold decision letters in...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as a consequence of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Income Tax Unit¡¯s (ITU) unlawful decision, the staff member had been harmed in the amount of the foreign tax credits he was required to use since he no longer had use of these credits to reduce his or his wife¡¯s income tax liability in future years. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the staff member¡¯s claim for a refund was not moot, as Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly determined. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no basis to the Secretary-General¡¯s claim that the ITU did not need to provide a refund of the foreign tax credits to the staff...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit to the Appellant¡¯s claims that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had failed to make findings on the specific category of misconduct and that she did not receive notice of the specific charge of theft prior to receiving a disciplinary sanction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that disciplinary cases were not criminal and that there was no need to give notice of a specific charge of theft because the charge against the Appellant was taking, without authorisation, a staff member¡¯s property. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not dispute having taken a bicycle without the owner¡¯s permission, but that she claimed she did not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the motion for execution of judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it had been provided with information from the Secretary-General that all six members of Dalgaard et al. had either resigned, retired or transferred from ICTY prior to the issuance of the impugned decision. In light of this information, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that none of them could rightfully claim that they were entitled to moral damages as a result of their rights being violated by the impugned decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT opined that the course of action taken by the Secretary-General, in deciding that Dalgaard et al. were...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding that the staff member¡¯s eligibility for ASHI should be determined based on the date of her recruitment to the ICTY in October 2006 instead of her appointment to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAKRT in October 2009. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, under Staff Rule 4. 17, the date of recruitment that is relevant for determining the terms of appointment of a former staff member who receives a new appointment after separating from the Organisation is the date of the new appointment. In the staff member¡¯s case, her new appointment with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAKRT was a re...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing since the factual and legal issues arising from the appeal had already been clearly defined. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no error in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s judgment that the application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT summary judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Ademagic¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the Assistant Secretary-General for Office of Human Resources Management did not give meaningful individual consideration to the staff members¡¯ requests for conversion to permanent appointments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it gave a clear directive to the Administration that, upon remand, it should consider the staff members¡¯ suitability for conversion to permanent appointments ¡°by reference to the relevant circumstances as they stood at the time of the first impugned refusal to convert their...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination and noted that it gave a clear directive to the Administration that, upon remand, it should consider staff member¡¯s suitability for conversion to a permanent appointment ¡°by reference to the relevant circumstances as they stood at the time of the first impugned refusal to convert her appointment¡± and that the Administration failed to comply with the said directive. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Assistant Secretary-General for Office of Human Resources Management failed to give any consideration whatsoever to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeals of both the Secretary-General and Mancussen et al. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the Assistant Secretary-General for Office of Human Resources Management did not give meaningful individual consideration to the staff members¡¯ requests for conversion to permanent appointments and noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT gave a clear directive to the Administration that, upon remand, it should consider the staff members¡¯ suitability for conversion to permanent appointments ¡°by reference to the relevant circumstances as they stood at the time of the first impugned refusal to convert...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the motion did not fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which provides that a revision must be based on the discovery of a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and to the party applying for revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence. The Applicants were relying on Article 31. 1 of the RoP and not on Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a rule could not supplant a statutory provision such as Article 11 and that Article 31. 1 only applied where there is no other expressly...