Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Order under appeal was an interlocutory decision because it struck out the matter, which, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT clarified, did not mean that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had dismissed the application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal as not receivable, noting that the Appellant could supplement her application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT within 90 days of the date of the publication of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT judgment.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Commissioner-General's submission that the appeal was defective because it failed to identify any of the grounds of appeal prescribed by Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s ground of appeal was without merit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Commissioner-General was obliged to calculate the Appellant¡¯s retirement benefits in accordance with the new Staff Rule and did so correctly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not commit any error of fact and law in arriving at its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not contest the decision to separate her from the Organisation, thus the SAB was not seized with her separation and her appeal on that issue was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims for compensation for pain, suffering, and medical expenses were beyond the scope of the case and therefore not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the IMO Secretary-General¡¯s decision to place the Appellant on sick leave was based on sound medical evidence which was not rebutted at the time and that there was no basis to set aside that decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held there was no basis...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered two appeals (consolidated) by Mr ElShanti of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA/DT/2019/051 and judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA/DT/2019/065 respectively. On the consolidation of the cases, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT had broad discretion in managing its cases and that it would only intervene in clear cases of denial of due process of law affecting a party¡¯s right to produce evidence. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected Mr ElShanti¡¯s arguments against consolidation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit to Mr ElShanti¡¯s claims that the characterization of the impugned administrative decision was incorrect, noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the request for an oral hearing, finding it would not assist in the expeditious and fair disposal of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, recalling the Spinardi jurisprudence (judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-957), that the decision on the Appellant¡¯s complaints was not made utilizing a neutral first instance process as required jurisdictionally by Article 2. 10 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the appealed decision was made by the ICAO Secretary-General whose own earlier decision(s) the Appellant had challenged. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and set aside the ICAO Secretary-General¡¯s and/or the AJAB¡¯s...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the report of the JAB was not a decision resulting from a neutral first instance process and therefore could not be appealed to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that such a case must be remanded for proper consideration by a neutral process that produces a record of the proceedings and a written decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the case could not be remanded to the JAB, whose functions were removed by Agreement between the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ and the WMO, signed on 20 January 2020 and effective the same date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for adjudication as a result of said Agreement on the extension of the...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT made no finding regarding whether the WMO JAB erred on its finding of receivability, given its decision to remand the matter to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the report of WMO JAB was not a decision resulting from a neutral first instance process and therefore could not be appealed to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that such a case had to be remanded for proper consideration by a neutral process that produces a record of the proceedings and a written decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the case could not be remanded to WMO JAB, whose functions were removed by Agreement between the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ and WMO dated 20 January 2020. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that AJAB¡¯s interim report did not constitute a neutral first instance process which included a written record and a written decision providing reasons, fact and law and as such, did not conform to the requirements of Article 2(10) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute or the Agreement between the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ and ICAO. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that at ICAO there was no neutral first instance process including a decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General of ICAO, who issued the contested decision, was not neutral, but a party to proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that under such circumstances it was not satisfied that the essential...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to follow the procedural requirements for an appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant contested a decision of the Pension Board, which had not been subject to review or appeal, neither by the Staff Pension Committee nor by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Pension Board. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not allowed to intervene in matters that had not previously been subject to internal reassessment by the Pension Fund. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal as not receivable.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the JAB process did not constitute a neutral first instance process that includes a decision, and therefore was not appealable to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General of WMO, who issued the contested decision, could not be regarded as a neutral body as he is a party. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT remanded the case to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, which constituted the neutral first instance process for WMO.
