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With regard to the decisions to transfer the Appellant from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS to GF / WHO, to transfer her back to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS and to put her on reimbursable loan to the GF, to deny her the right to return to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS, and to separate her from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS upon the expiry of her SLWOP on 30 June 2012, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in holding that the Appellant¡¯s challenges were time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to seek timely management evaluation of her separation from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS on 30 June 2012. With respect to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the Appellant was not challenging her financial package and that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that it has consistently held that Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute must be read literally to prohibit Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT from waiving the deadlines for seeking management evaluation and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has no jurisdiction or competence to waive such deadlines. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and, while it was unfortÄ¢¹½ÊÓƵATe that Mr. Nianda-Lusakueno relied on the informal review procedure, such reliance did not qualify as exceptional circumstances under ICAO Staff Rule 111. 1, paragraph 8. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Secretary-General of ICAO.

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion ¡°for a finding of the Respondent¡¯s dissembling. ¡± With respect to the substance of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, regardless of the nature of the new fact discovered by an applicant, timeliness of the filing of an application for revision is essential. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

The Appellant claimed that her interpretation of the advice given by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Registry was that an extension of time was not needed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it has repeatedly and consistently strictly enforced the time limits for filing applications and appeals, which assures the goal of hearing cases and rendering judgments in a timely fashion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that it was unreasonable for the Appellant, even as a layperson, to conclude that an extension of time would never be needed and that there was no limitation on the time for filing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any error of law...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant and her counsel were provided with an adequate opportunity to file an application in a timely manner, but failed to do so, causing her application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT to be non-receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that, even if it were to disregard the untimely submission of the application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT, the application would remain non-receivable because the Appellant did not seek in a timely manner the required request for review of the contested administrative decision she intended to overturn. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that the Appellant¡¯s claim was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was evident that the Appellant knew of the process of management evaluation at the time of the impugned administrative decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly exercised its discretion to award costs against the Appellant for abuse of the judicial process, as her failure to apply for management evaluation was deliberate and thus her application was frivolous and vexatious. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal in its entirety and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal regarding the judgment on Receivability (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/063) and the judgment on the Merits (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2010/085). As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied Ms Hunt-Matthews' request for an oral hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Secretary-General may properly appeal the judgment on Receivability as part of the judgment on the Merits and that it was timely. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT should have received Ms Hunt-Matthes¡¯ application and found that it was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred when it determined that Ms Hunt-Matthes¡¯ claims of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered two appeals by the staff member of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order Nos. 109 and 110. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeals were receivable because they were addressed against judicial decisions which disposed the cases before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Finding that the two appeals raised the same legal issues, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT consolidated them in the interest of judicial economy and consistency. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the Secretary-General¡¯s observations about the non-receivability of the appeals. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, however, that the motions for reinstatement were in fact non-receivable ab initio. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no statutory...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT had correctly determined that the application was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had failed to establish that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT had committed errors in law or fact in reaching its decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claim that he was denied legal representation was not made before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT, although it was a circumstance that was known to the Appellant at that time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would not permit the issue to be raised for the first time on appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

The Secretary-General appealed, regarding the judgments on liability and relief. Mr. Wasserstorm also appealed regarding the judgment of relief. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Secretary-General that the Ethics Office is limited to making recommendations to the Administration and found that the recommendations are not administrative decisions subject to judicial review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT accordingly upheld the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal on receivability. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reversed the judgment on Liability and vacated the judgment on Relief. With respect to the award of costs, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Secretary-General¡¯s refusal to...