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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal, specifically as to whether Mr Gehr was prejudiced or discommoded by the fact that his rebuttal was conducted by the rebuttal panel established in 2011. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find that Mr Gehr¡¯s obligation to engage with a panel established pursuant to ST/AI/2010/5 was, in and of itself, sufficient to merit an award of compensation, in the absence of specific harm or prejudice arising therefrom. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the breach was not of sufficient seriousness to merit a compensatory award. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment in its entirety.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT preliminarily dismissed the Appellant¡¯s Application for Confidentiality and then considered the merits of the Appeal, which contained three grounds. With respect to the first ground, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in concluding that due process was satisfied if the staff member could comment on anonymous witness statements providing evidence against him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the reasons for withholding the identities of the victims and for not producing them at trial were contained in the OIOS Investigation Report that was sent to the Appellant, thus the conditions for the admissibility for...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals of Order Nos. 182 (GVA/2013), 183 (GVA/2013), and 199 (GVA/2013), and Summary judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/147. As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the Appellant¡¯s requests for oral proceedings, confidentiality, to file additional proceedings, to file additional documentary evidence, and to order production of documents. With respect to Orders Nos. 182, 183 and 199, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not exceed its competence or jurisdiction in issuing these orders and in denying the Appellant¡¯s applications to suspend action. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeals of these Orders were not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Roig¡¯s application for correction and noted that there were no clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the correction procedure is not an opportunity for a party to reargue their case or to merely repeat arguments that did not previously succeed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for correction.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General contended that the Ethics Office¡¯s determination that no credible prima facie case of retaliation had been established was not an administrative decision subject to judicial review under Article 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the key characteristic of an administrative decision subject to judicial review is that the decision must produce direct legal consequences affecting a staff member¡¯s terms or conditions of appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that, in this case, the recommendation of the Ethics Office had no legal...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Goodwin¡¯s cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred by awarding excessive compensation to Mr Goodwin. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT relied on Larkin (judgment No. 2011-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-134) on the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s discretion to determine the amount of damages. Noting the long period before Mr Goodwin before returning to full service and that the amount of compensation awarded was based on the JAB¡¯s recommendation, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that compensation in the amount of two years¡¯ net base salary was reasonable. In considering whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in concluding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal and Mr Skourikhine¡¯s cross-appeal. With respect to the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there is no requirement in Section 9. 4 of ST/AI/2010/3 for the head of department to first review all non-rostered candidates, and it had even been amended to specifically remove such a requirement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law in deciding that the appointment of the rostered candidates was contrary to ST/AI/2010/3, as the decision to do so was entirely within the Administration¡¯s discretion, and no abuse of that discretion has been...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General which challenged the remedies afforded Mr Eissa. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in not explaining which irregularities were substantive and which were procedural, as either type of irregularity may support an award of moral damages. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no merit in the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that the award was duplicative of the award of alternative compensation in lieu of rescission. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an award under Article 10(5)(a) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute is alternative...

The Appellant claimed that her interpretation of the advice given by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Registry was that an extension of time was not needed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it has repeatedly and consistently strictly enforced the time limits for filing applications and appeals, which assures the goal of hearing cases and rendering judgments in a timely fashion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that it was unreasonable for the Appellant, even as a layperson, to conclude that an extension of time would never be needed and that there was no limitation on the time for filing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any error of law...

The Appellant requested that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment be set aside and that the case be remanded to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT for a hearing de novo before a different judge. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Appellant¡¯s submission that the relevant statute or rules of procedure do not prohibit an applicant from providing testimony and serving as a witness in their own case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, while Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was required to administer the declaration prescribed in Article 17(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT RoP, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s failure to do so was not an error serious enough so as to affect the decision of the case. Conversely, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s refusal to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that it has consistently held that Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute must be read literally to prohibit Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT from waiving the deadlines for seeking management evaluation and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has no jurisdiction or competence to waive such deadlines. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and, while it was unfortÄ¢¹½ÊÓƵATe that Mr. Nianda-Lusakueno relied on the informal review procedure, such reliance did not qualify as exceptional circumstances under ICAO Staff Rule 111. 1, paragraph 8. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Secretary-General of ICAO.

With regard to the decisions to transfer the Appellant from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS to GF / WHO, to transfer her back to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS and to put her on reimbursable loan to the GF, to deny her the right to return to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS, and to separate her from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS upon the expiry of her SLWOP on 30 June 2012, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in holding that the Appellant¡¯s challenges were time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to seek timely management evaluation of her separation from Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS on 30 June 2012. With respect to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the Appellant was not challenging her financial package and that the...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion ¡°for a finding of the Respondent¡¯s dissembling. ¡± With respect to the substance of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, regardless of the nature of the new fact discovered by an applicant, timeliness of the filing of an application for revision is essential. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal of judgment on Receivability No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/061 and of judgment on the Merits No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/101. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal of the judgment on Receivability was timely. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that Mr Ngokeng¡¯s satisfactory appraisal constituted an appealable administrative decision, as there was no evidence of any adverse administrative decision stemming from Mr Ngokeng¡¯s performance appraisal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT specifically noted that the First Reporting Officer¡¯s comment on Mr Ngokeng¡¯s output did not detract from the overall satisfactory...

The Secretary-General appealed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision to admit to judicial review Ms Al-Badri's challenge against the decision to abolish her post in Amman and to create a new post at the same level in Baghdad. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT only considered the receivability of this appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that alleged excess of jurisdiction or competence on the part of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, so as to admit an appeal of an interlocutory order or judgment, must be clear or manifest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled its jurisprudence that the general principle underlying the right of appeal set out in Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute is that only final judgments of...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT acknowledged that while the Appellant was eligible for a permanent appointment, the Administration was entitled to have regard to the fact that she was recruited because she was a national of Romania for the specific post in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵIC Bucharest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that both the Department of Public Information and the Officer-in-Charge of Human Resources Services previously anticipated that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵIC Bucharest, among others, was scheduled to close in the very near future, due to the uncertainty of the funding by the host country, on which the continuation of the Appellant¡¯s post depended. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal and noted that the letters of appointment issued to the Appellant for the period of 1 July 2009 through 30 June 2012 did not refer to either the Memorandum, that described the planned phasing-out of the PTA, or the PTA itself. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that the PTA is neither a benefit or entitlement under the Staff Regulations and Rules, which ¡°embody the conditions of service and the basic rights and duties and obligations of United Nations staff members,¡± nor an ¡°administrative issuance in application of, and consistent with, the said Regulations and Rules. ¡±...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Standing Committee did not err in holding the application was not receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in refusing to receive the application, the Standing Committee also implicitly refused to find ¡°good cause¡± to waive the sixty days¡¯ time limit for review set forth in Section K of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Administrative Rules. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also found no error in this implicit determination and held that a waiver of five years for review by the Standing Committee would be unreasonable, especially in light of the time limits in the Transfer Agreement between Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF and CTBTO. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the Appellant¡¯s request for an oral hearing. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF correctly applied Article 45 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJPSF Regulations and relied on an internationally binding judgment about spousal and child support, issued by an Austrian court, which was not contradicted by the divorce decree issued by a Portuguese court. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no error of law or fact such as to vitiate the contested decision and upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF¡¯s ¡°reasoned and well-founded decision.¡± Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJPSB decision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeals by the Secretary-General challenging Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the decision not to investigate Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵSU election matters was receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held by majority that the appeal was not receivable, based on jurisprudence that a party may not appeal against a judgment in which it has prevailed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that although Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT reviewed the merits of the decision despite the Secretary-General¡¯s argument that the decision was not receivable ratione materiae, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT found in favour of the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as there was no negative impact to the Secretary-General...