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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeals of both the Secretary-General and Mancussen et al. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s determination that the Assistant Secretary-General for Office of Human Resources Management did not give meaningful individual consideration to the staff members¡¯ requests for conversion to permanent appointments and noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT gave a clear directive to the Administration that, upon remand, it should consider the staff members¡¯ suitability for conversion to permanent appointments ¡°by reference to the relevant circumstances as they stood at the time of the first impugned refusal to convert...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that while only final judgments of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT are appealable, exceptions may be made when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction or competence regarding interlocutory orders. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that an order denying an application for suspension of action does not constitute Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeding its jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly found that it had no jurisdiction to grant the application under Article 10(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable ratione materiae.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made both factual and legal errors when it concluded that 15 March 2013 was the date on which the Appellant received notification of the administrative decision within the meaning of Staff Rule 11.2(c). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that 18 April 2013 was the date on which the Appellant received notification of the administrative decision not to renew her fixed-term appointment, which is when the 60-day period began to run under Staff rule 11.2(c). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant made her request for management evaluation within the 60 days of 18 April 2013, thus...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT first considered the receivability of the appeal and held that it was receivable, pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that the Ethics Office is limited to making recommendations, which are not administrative decisions subject to judicial review, to the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT made no error in dismissing the applications on the ground that the Ethics Office matters were not administrative decisions subject to judicial review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT acknowledged that the Ethics Office failed in its duty to make a recommendation pursuant to Section 5.7 of ST/SGB/2005/21...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT made an error of fact, resulting in an unreasonable decision when it found that the Appellant submitted her request for decision review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the evidence showed that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not make a factual error when it found that the request for decision review was made on 7 July 2014. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, as the request for decision review was submitted on 7 July 2014, the time for the Appellant to file an application for judicial review expired 120 days thereafter, on 4 November 2014. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant¡¯s application for judicial review was not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s finding and held that ¡°the nature of the decision, the legal framework under which the decision was made, and the consequences of the decision¡± all support the conclusion that the Administration¡¯s response to a request for management evaluation is not a reviewable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the response to a request for management evaluation is an opportunity for the Administration to resolve a staff member¡¯s grievance without litigation and not a fresh decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT addressed all the appeals in a unique judgment. Regarding judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2015/100, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA staff member cannot bring an application against the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Secretary-General challenging a decision by the Organisation denying him or her employment with the Organisation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly concluded that the application was not receivable. Regarding Orders Nos. 319, 320, and 400, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT reiterated that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT is only under exceptional circumstances competent to judge appeals of interlocutory orders, namely when Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the motion did not fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, which provides that a revision must be based on the discovery of a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and to the party applying for revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence. The Applicants were relying on Article 31. 1 of the RoP and not on Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a rule could not supplant a statutory provision such as Article 11 and that Article 31. 1 only applied where there is no other expressly...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an interlocutory appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not ¡°clearly exceed its competence or jurisdiction¡± when it temporarily suspended the administrative decision to laterally reassign the staff member as that decision did not constitute a case of ¡°appointment, promotion, or termination¡± excluded from interim relief under Article 10. 2 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the interlocutory appeal as not receivable.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had not addressed the Appellant¡¯s request for an extension of time but had rather converted sua sponte the request into an incomplete application and summarily adjudged the application as not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT could not have converted sua sponte the Appellant¡¯s request for more time into an application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had not afforded the Appellant the opportunity to file an application and had committed several procedural errors, exceeded its jurisdiction and competence, and violated the Appellant¡¯s due process rights. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing finding that it would not assist in the expeditious and fair disposal of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the evidence showed that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had correctly found that the administrative decision denying ASHI/MIP to the Appellant was communicated to her in an e-mail of 1 May 2014. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the e-mail of 27 May 2014 ¡°did not refer to any new fact or information¡± and was ¡°a mere confirmation of the earlier and unambiguous decision of 1 May 2014¡±. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had not erred in law or fact resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision when...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the request for an oral hearing finding no need for further clarification of the issues. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to identify the grounds for his appeal, considering it defective. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT that the Appellant had not complied with Staff Rule 111.3, which prescribes that the staff member is required to appeal to the JAB within thirty days. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s conclusion that the application was not receivable did not present any errors of law or fact. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT had correctly determined that the Appellant had failed to comply with the time limits set forth in former Area Staff Rule 111.3, making his application not receivable as it pertained to his challenge to the decision denying eligibility for the post of Database Manager. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had never sought review of the decision to separate him from service, failing to comply with Article 8.1(c) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Statute, which requires that an applicant must submit the contested administrative decision for decision review first. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that despite acknowledging that under Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT¡¯s jurisprudence, a rebuttal panel is not a technical body, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT declined to follow its jurisprudence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had erred by waiving the management evaluation as a receivability requirement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT exceeded its jurisdiction, and made an error of law when it received an application, which was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the appeal was upheld and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment in its entirety.

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant the granting of the Appellant¡¯s motion for leave to file a reply to the Commissioner-General¡¯s answer and denied the motion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA¡¯s findings that the application was not receivable ratione temporis because it was filed more than three years after the receipt of the termination decision and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT had no discretion to waive the regulatory time limit of three years, were unassailable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT correctly found that the application was not receivable ratione...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT had before it an appeal of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2015/006. As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered a motion to seek to leave to postpone consideration of the Appellant¡¯s appeal due to lack of legal representation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with the Secretary-General¡¯s claim that the Motion filed by the Appellant was an additional supplemental pleading addressing the merits of his claims. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not shown exceptional circumstances justifying the filing of an additional pleading or good cause to postpone consideration of his appeal and his request was denied. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could find no fault with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that the application was not receivable ratione materiae, which accorded with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT¡¯s jurisprudence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, since that ground was sufficient to affirm the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and to dismiss the appeal, there was no need for it to determine whether the application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT challenged a specific implied administrative decision on the part of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF or whether the Appellant was merely making general complaints about Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵICEF¡¯s failure to protect him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to identify the grounds for his appeal and thus, the appeal was defective. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT inferred that the Appellant claimed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the legal conclusion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the application before it was not receivable was unassailable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err when it did not discuss whether the case was an exceptional case for extending, waiving, or suspending the deadline for the filing of the application. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a staff member cannot extend the statutory deadline to appeal by filing post-judgment motions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that to hold otherwise would allow the parties to set their own deadlines for appeal of a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and undermine the mandatory nature of the statutory deadline in Article 7.1(c) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

Noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT concluded that the Office of Staff Legal Assistance (OSLA) had provided the Appellant with legal assistance and that its refusal to provide legal representation was reasoned, appropriate, and did not breach any lawful obligations of OSLA, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law or fact or exceed its competence in reaching this conclusion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no fault with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s rejection of the Appellant¡¯s contention that OSLA had no discretionary authority. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law or fact or exceed its competence in finding that the reasons for OSLA¡¯s decision were...