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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application of the Secretary-General for interpretation of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-240. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application did not fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and was therefore manifestly inadmissible. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the judgment clearly stated that the utilisation of foreign tax credits constituted a reimbursable payment method and the tax unit had calculated the relevant reimbursable amount at USD 15, 239. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s application and ordered the Secretary-General to pay Ms Johnson USD 15,239 with interest, stating that the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not sustain the conclusion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Mr Koutang¡¯s actions did not amount to misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the sanction imposed was not unreasonable, absurd, or disproportionate and, as such, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Administration¡¯s broad discretion in disciplinary matters. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the sanction disproportionate and in substituting its opinion for that of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that: the Sidells were negligent in not reporting their marriage before their separation from service; Mr Sidell notified Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF in October 2003 of his marriage to Mrs Sidell and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF requested him to provide his original marriage certificate, which he did; and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF did not follow up with Mr Sidell about the matter. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, by remaining silent, created a reasonable expectation on the part of the Sidells that Mr Sidell¡¯s pension record was corrected and that his marriage to Mr Sidell was recognised by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in the circumstances, it was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that grounds existed to discharge Mr Leal for misconduct, without needing to address the issue of the alleged circumvention of the recruitment process for the purposes of hiring. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the misconduct and disciplinary measure of dismissal fell within the discretion of the Secretary-General and could not be seen as disproportionate to the offences unless it was the result of proven abuse or arbitrary exercise of that discretion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the key elements of Mr Leal¡¯s due process were met. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, since the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was satisfied that Ms Akello¡¯s involvement in the private company Blessed Seasons, which was on a Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ list of companies providing escort vehicle services, met the standard of business activity and enterprise prohibited by former Staff Regulation 1. 2(m) and that her activities amounted to a conflict of interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in ruling otherwise, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and fact and the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal succeeded on that ground. On the issue of whether the very fact that the Internal Affairs Unit investigation, having...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against judgment Nos. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2011/209 (on liability) and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2012/062 (on relief). Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no evidence to support the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s conclusion that, had the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Staff Pension Committee (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵSPC) not proceeded with its determination, Ms Shanks would more likely than not have been found fit to resume her duties. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the only valid conclusion available on the medical evidence was that Ms Shanks was not entitled to return to work on a part-time basis since she was not able to obtain medical clearance permitting it. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for interpretation by Mr Shkurtaj on the issue of interest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT referred to Warren (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-059) and Mmata (judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-092) for the holding that interest was to be paid at the US Prime rate from the date on which the entitlement became due. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the interest payable was at the US Prime Rate and that an extra five per cent should be added to the US Prime Rate if the judgment was not executed within 60 days of its issuance. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the date from which interest on the compensation was to be paid at the US Prime Rate was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Gakumba¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-387. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not fulfil the statutory requirements and was seemingly disguised as an attempt to re-open the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it would be manifestly unreasonable to submit that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP Conversion Policy issued in 2010 could not be argued by the staff member in 2012 before the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, or in 2013 before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no valid reason had been provided about the untimely submission of the application for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal as to whether Ms Carrabregu was eligible to be considered for a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the factual sequence clearly showed that Ms Carrabregu freely and willingly resigned from her service with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDP to take up an appointment with a different entity (Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵV), thereby causing a break in service. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that this break in service should have led Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to uphold the administrative decision that Ms Carrabregu was not eligible for conversion to a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further noted that Ms Carrabregu¡¯s service to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵV could not be...

The Secretary-General appealed Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s decision to admit to judicial review Ms Al-Badri's challenge against the decision to abolish her post in Amman and to create a new post at the same level in Baghdad. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT only considered the receivability of this appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that alleged excess of jurisdiction or competence on the part of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, so as to admit an appeal of an interlocutory order or judgment, must be clear or manifest. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled its jurisprudence that the general principle underlying the right of appeal set out in Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute is that only final judgments of...