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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law or in failing to take into account in that calculation the probable length of Mr Dabbour¡¯s tenure in that role which was known to have been of a fixed duration of three years. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, although the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT in Mr Dabbour¡¯s case had recorded its conclusions on some of these considerations, it did not do so at all in respect of others making it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain objectively how it reached the apparently modest figure of compensation in lieu of recission of USD 1,000. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was nothing to indicate why Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that Mr Russo-Got¡¯s application against the abolition of his post was not receivable, as he had failed to make a request for management evaluation within time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT also correctly dismissed his application against the non-renewal of his FTA because he had received notice of the date of the non-renewal, there was no express promise to renew, and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵOPS was not obliged to find him an alternative post.

Regarding Contested Decision #1, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the staff member did not seek timely management evaluation of the refusals of his request to transfer. Further, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that there is no provision in the Staff Regulations and Rules addressing changes or transfers of posts for medical reasons. Additionally, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also noted that the medical information at those relevant times recommended early medical retirement, not a transfer. Regarding Contested Decision #2, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT observed that there was no evidence that the staff member ought to have been appointed to the post in...

The Secretary-General appealed arguing that the Organization had no obligation to make all reasonable efforts to place the staff member in available suitable posts, as he only had an FTA and that such obligation was meant only for those who had continuing or permanent appointments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT disagreed and found that staff members should be ¡°retained¡± in an order of priority favouring, first, those with continuing appointments; second, holders of FTAs of more than two years¡¯ duration who were recruited competitively; and third and finally, other FTA holders. In the instant case, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found because...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order No. 087 by Ms Barud. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed her motion to admit additional documents related to the substantive issue of justification for the non-renewal of her contract, due to their lack of relevance to the matter for decision by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT on her application for a suspension of action. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there was no reason why these documents could not be used by Ms Barud for the substantive matter, which was, at that time, before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal failed on the grounds that Ms Barud did not apply for a suspension within the statutory time limit. In...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-914 from Mr Oglesby. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Oglesby failed to establish the required grounds for a revision of judgment, namely the discovery of a decisive fact that was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and the party applying for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it had concluded in the impugned judgment that it was unable to apply the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Charter or the UDHR directly, or strike down clear Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT opined that it was within the combined powers of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, the Secretary-General and the General...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General raised the argument, inter alia, that Ms Lamb¡¯s retroactive appointment was disrupted when she resigned and separated and, therefore, she had no contractual relationship with the Organisation obliging it to place her preferentially in vacant posts as someone holding a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT concluded correctly that (1) Ms Lamb¡¯s employment ended in mid-2013 by her own initiative and (2) there was nothing in the documentation relating to Ms Lamb¡¯s resignation to support her assertion that it was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-948 by Ms Bezziccheri. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Ms Bezziccheri¡¯s claim that ST/AI/2019/1 was unknown to her and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT at the time the judgment was issued. Noting the three elements that an applicant for revision must establish cumulatively before a final judgment of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT can be revised, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the fact that ST/AI/2019/1 was known to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT when it issued its judgment (as it had been referred to therein) was sufficient in and of itself to fail the cumulative test. Further, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that ST/AI/2019/1 was not determinative of Ms...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that the 1994 and 2018 requests made by the Appellant to change his date of birth were essentially the same requests. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that the reiteration of an original administrative decision if repeatedly questioned, does not reset the clock with respect to the statutory timeline. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the statutory period during which the Appellant had to file a challenge to the 1994 decision expired in 1997. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT did not err in dismissing the application. On consideration of the Respondent¡¯s claim to award costs, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not satisfied that the pursuit of the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that all of the Appellant¡¯s grounds of appeal failed, except for his challenge to the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA decision not to renew or extend the Appellant¡¯s limited duration contract beyond its final extension, for the simple reason that those several decisions to extend his contract advantaged him by adding, in total, six months to his contract. On the issue of the Appellant¡¯s non-renewal or final extension, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s reasoning and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was justified in deciding not to renew or extend his employment, noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA faced a massive financial shortfall...

On the Appellant¡¯s claim that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Judge was biased, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s specific allegations were not made out and any missteps in the conduct of the hearing did not warrant interference with the result. On the Appellant¡¯s claim that his supervisor harassed him to the extent that his actions were mitigated substantially, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even if the Appellant established that there was a dysfunctional relationship between him and his supervisor, this could not have had the effect of mitigating his actions significantly, such were the scale and duration of his misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was receivable on the basis that the Appellant was not challenging the new scheme for education grant introduced by the General Assembly, but rather the manner in which it was implemented in her specific case and the way in which the Secretary-General interpreted General Assembly Resolution 70/244. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in deciding that the Appellant did not have an acquired right to all of the previous education benefits she had enjoyed. On the question of the Appellant¡¯s access to a discretionary consideration of her claims on exceptional grounds, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT...

The Secretary-General appealed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment as it related to the non-renewal decision only. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a shifting onus of proof was appropriate where the non-renewal decision was based on a lack of funds. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found nothing objectionable with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s reference to the burden or onus of proof resting with the Secretary-General in the circumstances of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in concluding that the Secretary-General failed to establish by evidence that the financial situation of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ body which had engaged Ms Loose at the time of the separation was still...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that exceptional circumstances existed which warranted an extension of time. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s discretion should have been exercised in the Appellant¡¯s favour because it affected access to justice and there is a presumption that access to justice should not be denied at the outset without compelling reasons, which were absent. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that circumstances beyond the Appellant¡¯s control prevented him from acting to file his appeal within the time limit and it would be unjust to visit upon the Appellant the consequences of an error (a fail in the electronic filing system) for which...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT failed to address some issues before it, in respect of which the Appellant is entitled to a reasoned decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in declining the Appellant¡¯s implicit request for a hearing in person, at least without having considered it and given reasons. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the termination of the Appellant¡¯s appointment could not be assessed as hasty, premature, or arbitrary, with particular reference to the Medical Board process. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that any opportunity of the Appellant¡¯s appointment to that vacancy had therefore passed, irrespective of her...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct not to conclude that the Appellant had initiated the physical fight. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was entitled to conclude the evidence of a witness was not clear and convincing, given inconsistencies. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT determined correctly that a prior altercation could not provide propensity evidence to corroborate witnesses¡¯ accounts of the physical fight because the prior altercation was not investigated properly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed an error in concluding that the Appellant had been unduly influenced into signing the settlement agreement, but that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application revision of judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-936 by Mr Diallo. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Diallo failed to establish the statutory conditions that had to be fulfilled before a judgment could be revised, namely there was no discovery of a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and to him. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that an application for revision of a judgment that does not meet the statutory prerequisites cannot be a collateral means of attack on the judgment or allowed to be the second right of final appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both Mr. Sirhan and the Commissioner-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT exceeded its competence and erred in fact and law by rescinding the decision to terminate Mr. Sirhan on medical grounds. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the decision to convene a Medical Board more than one month after Mr. Sirhan¡¯s service-incurred injury in order to examine his fitness for continued service with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA was reasonable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT erred in law in interpreting the Area Staff Rules as requiring Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA to provide injured staff members adequate time for recovery before deciding to appoint a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT denied the request for an oral hearing, finding it would not assist in the expeditious and fair disposal of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held, recalling the Spinardi jurisprudence (judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-957), that the decision on the Appellant¡¯s complaints was not made utilizing a neutral first instance process as required jurisdictionally by Article 2. 10 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the appealed decision was made by the ICAO Secretary-General whose own earlier decision(s) the Appellant had challenged. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and set aside the ICAO Secretary-General¡¯s and/or the AJAB¡¯s...

The Applicant filed a second application for interpretation of judgment No. 2017-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-774 and an application for execution of judgment No. 2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-827. Subsequently, the Applicant requested leave to withdraw these two applications. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT granted leave to withdraw the applications and directed the Registrar to close the cases.