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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered Mr Maghari¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2010-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-039. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was receivable ratione temporis. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the grounds filed did not fall within Article 11(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute and did not constitute a decisive fact which was, at the time the judgment was rendered, known to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and to the party applying for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Maghari merely disagreed with the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT decision and sought to reargue his appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the application for revision.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Applicant¡¯s application for revision of judgment No. 2012-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-209. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the request filed by the Applicant constituted a disguised way to criticise the judgment or to expose grounds to disagree with it, a recourse against a final judgment that is not provided for in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the issuance of another judgment during the same session as which the Applicant¡¯s case was decided did not constitute a new fact, but rather law and that there was no possibility for a revision based on law. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the application was submitted almost one year...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2012/159; an appeal by the ¡°Applicant¡± (anonymity granted) against judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/079; and a cross-appeal by the Secretary-General of judgment No. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT/2013/079. On receivability, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s case that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred on the issue of receivability as the non-disciplinary issues contested by the Applicant were never submitted for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, in deciding that the non-disciplinary issues had been submitted for management evaluation, erred in law and in fact...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT correctly concluded that the placement of the Appellant on SLWOP enabled him to preserve his pension benefits, granted him the opportunity of remaining a staff member for the purpose of applying as an internal candidate for other positions, and made his relocation possible. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no abuse of authority or deliberate attempt to harm, as argued by the Appellant, but rather the Organisation adopted a protective approach. Noting that, due to the downsizing exercise related to the Appellant¡¯s post and his reassignment, he was not entitled to SLWFP and his...

On the Appellant¡¯s claims of discriminatory and arbitrary practices, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not find that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT committed any error of law or procedure of any factual error such as to result in a manifestly unreasonable decision and Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s findings demonstrated that it took cognisance of all relevant information. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT in holding that it was for the High Commissioner to determine the relative importance of the criteria to use for promotion. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in law or fact when it determined that the Appellant was afforded proper consideration and in finding...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any error when it determined that the application before it was not receivable as it was time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it was technically improper for Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT to analyse the merits of the case after declaring the application time-barred. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even if the appeal had been receivable ratione temporis, the Appellant¡¯s claim could not succeed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant merely made statements and referred to facts that were not timely contested, without providing any evidence or contesting the reasoning of the first instance judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the argument that there was no evidence to indicate that the Appellant received the letter communicating the outcome of the management evaluation on 14 July 2011, noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT relied on the Appellant¡¯s statement to ascertain that date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to show any error on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General rightly submitted that the deadline for the Appellant to file an application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was 12 October 2011, notwithstanding any ambiguity as to when she actually received the management evaluation response and the appeal failed on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the payment of interest awarded by Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT on the payment of Mr Ahmed¡¯s accrued vacation days was undue, noting that any delay in the separation formalities was entirely attributable to him and, as such, he could not be compensated for the delay in payment. On the compensation in lieu of notice, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT upheld the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment and held that the matter was properly before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and could not be construed as res judicata. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the Administration made a commitment to pay Mr Ahmed compensation in lieu of notice and...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered appeals from both Mr Schoone and the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, for the reasons set forth in judgment Nos. 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-357 (Malmstrom et al. ), 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-358 (Longone) and 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-359 (Ademagic et al. ), the delegation of authority granted to the ICTY Registrar could not be construed so as to grant him the authority to convert staff members¡¯ fixed-term appointments into permanent appointments. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT recalled that in those three cases it had held that the decision-making authority to grant permanent appointments was properly vested in the Assistant Secretary-General for...

Noting the Secretary-General¡¯s contention that administrative review by ICAO is the equivalent of management evaluation under Article 7(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT Statute, and Article 7(3) must be interpreted in the same manner as Article 8(3) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed that Article 7(3) prohibited Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT from waiving the deadline by which the Appellant was required to seek administrative review. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it did not have jurisdiction or competence to address the merits of the substantive claims of the Appellant since AJAB did not consider the merits of those claims as the neutral first instance...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err on questions of fact by ignoring or failing to examine what the Appellant considered to be evidence, which constituted mere allegations and unsubstantiated argumentation on his part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant did not support his submission by any grounds which would bring the issue within the remit of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT. Noting that the Appellant relied upon the statements and observations which he had brought before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that a litigant¡¯s past allegations and arguments cannot be considered evidence per se. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was not the task of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT (or Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT)...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had not established any error in fact or law emerging from the impugned judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant did not challenge the competitive procedure¡¯s final administrative act since he only began to contest the Administration¡¯s actions when the selected candidate was laterally moved, and another rostered candidate was appointed as a replacement. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s rights as a staff member were linked to the administrative decision that completed the selection procedure and that, as such, any breach of his rights could only be caused by that...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Secretary-General¡¯s appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in ¡°double-counting¡± by using the same element of Mr Andersson¡¯s high chance of promotion to justify both its award of CHF 10,000 in lieu of rescission, as well as its award of CHF 4,000 for moral damages. The claim for moral damages was related to the reparation of an injury, that could not be regarded as covered by the payment of CHF 10,000 awarded as an alternative to rescission. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT also rejected the Secretary-General¡¯s submission that Mr Andersson only fleetingly referred to...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to show proper consideration for judicial economy and efficiency by choosing to proceed with a hearing on the merits of Mr Cooke¡¯s application in full knowledge of an appeal by the Secretary-General and ignoring the possibility that its judgment on Receivability might be reversed, as it was. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that when it determines that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT improperly received an application and reverses or vacates a judgment on receivability, any judgment on the merits is null and void ab initio. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT clarified that this did not...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment was not manifestly unreasonable in concluding that the date upon which the Appellant was on notice that he had received a response from the Management Evaluation Unit (MEU) or that it was his responsibility to read the MEU response as soon as possible. On the question of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in law and/or failed to exercise its jurisdiction in declining to consider the case on the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, in the absence of a prior written request for a suspension or waiver of the time limit for filing his application, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was not competent to consider the issue...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it could not sustain the conclusion of Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that Mr Koutang¡¯s actions did not amount to misconduct. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the sanction imposed was not unreasonable, absurd, or disproportionate and, as such, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Administration¡¯s broad discretion in disciplinary matters. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding the sanction disproportionate and in substituting its opinion for that of the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT allowed the appeal and vacated the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT agreed with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT that the request for management evaluation was time-barred and not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the 60-day time limit for the purpose of requesting management evaluation of a non-selection decision started on 29 October 2010, when the staff member was informed of her non-selection, and not on 17 December 2010, when she learned of the identity of the selected candidate. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no second administrative decision that reset the time limit; rather, the staff member learning the identity of the selected candidate was a consequence of the administrative decision...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT decision that the application was not receivable as consistent with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA Area Staff Rule 111. 2 and Article 8 of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT Statute. On alleged errors in procedure, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that the Appellant had no opportunity to challenge the untimeliness of the Commissioner-General¡¯s reply before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT, but that, since the Appellant had not demonstrated how the untimely reply affected Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s decision on receivability, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found no merit on this ground. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that there was no error in Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s reasoning on the issue of EVR. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, absent an appealable...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT vacated Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s award of CHF 5,000. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, while Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had the power to award costs for manifest abuse of proceedings before JAB, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in finding that the Secretary-General¡¯s delay in responding to the JAB report constituted a manifest abuse of proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the delay in question was not inordinate and, in any event, a delay in and of itself, did not constitute a manifest abuse of proceedings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT could lawfully award costs against the Secretary-General, it was necessary to determine on the evidence that the delay constituted a wrong or...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that there had been a policy change in 1997 which meant that staff members who requested pension as a result of an accident suffered in the service of the Organisation post-1997 were granted it with the proviso that it would only be paid until they retired. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, as the Appellant¡¯s accident occurred long after the policy change in 1997, the changed policy was applicable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that as the Appellant had reached retirement age at the time of the incapacitating injury, his appeal had to be dismissed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.