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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the appeal, in which the Appellant contended that exceptional circumstances existed that would merit a waiver of the time limit, allowing his application to be admitted. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that, in such an instance, it is the applicant¡¯s responsibility to convince the tribunal of such circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT found that the Appellant did not overcome this hurdle before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT and held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not err in rejecting the Appellant¡¯s contentions that he had exceptional circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT further held that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the Appellant¡¯s reliance on erroneous advice...

The Appellant contested the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that he was afforded full and fair consideration for the position of Chief and argued that he suffered unfair and discriminatory treatment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that if the Administration does not comply with a Tribunal¡¯s order to disclose the reasons for an administrative decision, as such, the Tribunal cannot automatically conclude that the decision was arbitrary, but it is entitled to draw an adverse inference from the refusal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT finding that the Administration¡¯s decision must be deemed unlawful, as the Secretary-General refused to comply...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application was submitted to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT after the expiration of the response period; the response period began on the date on which she received a letter from the Management Evaluation Unit informing her that her request for a management evaluation was not receivable because, as a judge, she was not a staff member or a former staff member within the meaning of the Staff Rules. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s claims that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judge erred on a question of fact, by considering the letter as the decision that concluded the management evaluation, and that it erred on a...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant had neither standing to challenge a decision which he alleged did not comply with the stipulations of his service contract nor the right to request the implementation of an arbitration procedure before Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT had committed an error in concluding that the Appellant had manifestly abused the process. The appeal was partially upheld and the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment partially vacated regarding the payment of USD 500.00 for abuse of procedure.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exclusion of the right to appeal a decision to suspend the execution of an administrative decision constitutes an exception to the general principle of the right to appeal and must, therefore, be narrowly interpreted; Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the exception applied only to jurisdictional decisions ordering the suspension of an administrative decision pending management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that no jurisdictional decision, which, as in matter before it, ordered the suspension of a contested administrative decision for a period beyond the date on which the management evaluation was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that only circumstances beyond an applicant¡¯s control that prevented them from timely exercising the right of appeal may be considered ¡°exceptional circumstances,¡± justifying a waiver of the statutory time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that an applicant¡¯s initial mistaken belief that decisions were lawful cannot be deemed to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying a waiver of the time limit to appeal those decisions, especially when they had every means of obtaining information from the Administration. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT was not persuaded by the Appellant¡¯s arguments upon appeal and did not find any...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General limited to the matter of compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal had to be allowed in part because Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT erred in setting the compensation in lieu of reinstatement at two years¡¯ net base salary without considering that Mr Gakumba¡¯s previous fixed-term appointments were one year each. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the expectancy of renewal could not be fixed beyond such a period and therefore reduced the compensation to one year¡¯s net base salary. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment on compensation for non-pecuniary damages and held that no error of law was...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, given the absolute restriction on its judicial discretion with respect to time limits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT ought not to have entered into a review of the possible existence of exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of the time limit. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the complaint was filed beyond the time limit for administrative review or management evaluation and beyond the threshold for receivability established by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s Statute and Rules of Procedure. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT did not accept the argument that there was no evidence to indicate that the Appellant received the letter communicating the outcome of the management evaluation on 14 July 2011, noting that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT relied on the Appellant¡¯s statement to ascertain that date. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed to show any error on Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT¡¯s part. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Secretary-General rightly submitted that the deadline for the Appellant to file an application with Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was 12 October 2011, notwithstanding any ambiguity as to when she actually received the management evaluation response and the appeal failed on...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT failed to show proper consideration for judicial economy and efficiency by choosing to proceed with a hearing on the merits of Mr Cooke¡¯s application in full knowledge of an appeal by the Secretary-General and ignoring the possibility that its judgment on Receivability might be reversed, as it was. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that when it determines that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT improperly received an application and reverses or vacates a judgment on receivability, any judgment on the merits is null and void ab initio. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT clarified that this did not...