2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-863, Afawubo
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered the Appellant¡¯s appeal. As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT refused the Appellant¡¯s Motion for Leave to File Additional Pleadings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT referred to Article 3(1) of the RoP and Section II. A. 3 of Practice Decision No. 1 of the Appeals Tribunal, which provides that it may grant such a motion only if there are exceptional circumstances. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Appellant did not demonstrate any exceptional circumstances in the present case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT also referred to the transitional measures provided by General Assembly Resolution 63/253 and Article 2(7) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT Statute, which notes that...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-860, Sirhan
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered an appeal by the Commissioner-General. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Commissioner-General¡¯s appeal was not time-barred and was, therefore, receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT found that no request for compensation for loss of earnings (salary) had been made. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT did not have jurisdiction to award compensation for loss of earnings. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that any financial loss appears to be generated as the main cause and directly by the Director of Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA Affairs, Lebanon¡¯s (DUA/L) decision to cancel the secondment and that this decision was found to be lawful by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT and that...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-861, Dahan
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered an appeal by the staff member arguing that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT erred in not awarding compensation in lieu of remand to ABCC as an alternative remedy. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT found no error in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT judgment not awarding in-lieu compensation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that since the Secretary-General concurred with the remand in question, the claim became moot. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that a claim of gross negligence against the Administration is a separate action that could not be included in this claim. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Appellant had not demonstrated that the delay had any impact on her physical or mental well-being, rejecting her...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-862, Majut
On appeal by the Secretary-General, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT erred in fact and in law in its finding that the facts of misconduct were not established by clear and convincing evidence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that a proper consideration of the whole of the evidence could only have led to one conclusion, and that is that the individual assaulted the victim. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT found that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT did not consider the evidence objectively, specifically by giving misplaced importance to minor inconsistencies, coming to unreasonable conclusions on the facts which were not supported by the evidence, and making speculations instead of...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-841, Quijano-Evans et al.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal and the staff members¡¯ cross-appeal. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT first considered the receivability of the appeal and held that the applications were receivable because the contested decision would have an adverse impact on the staff members. With respect to the merits of the appeal, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that the salary entitlements of staff members are statutory in nature and may be unilaterally amended by the General Assembly. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT further noted that an individual loss caused by a unilateral variation of a validly concluded contract poses no legal obstacle to the exercise of...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-842, Mirella et al.
On an appeal by the Secretary-General, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT erred in concluding that the applications were receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT Statute limits the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT¡¯s jurisdiction to hearing appeals against administrative decisions. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT defined an administrative decision as a unilateral decision of an administrative nature taken by the administration involving the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of a statutory instrument, which adversely affects the rights of a staff member and produces direct legal consequences. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that, with the...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-840, Lloret-Alca?iz et al.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT found that the appeal raised significant questions of law about the power of the Organisation to unilaterally alter or reduce the compensation of staff members of the Organisation. For that reason, the President of Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT in terms of Article 10(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT Statute elected to refer the appeal for consideration by the full bench of Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT recalled that an administrative decision is a unilateral decision of an administrative nature taken by the administration involving the exercise of a power or the performance of a function in terms of a statutory instrument, which adversely affects...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-855, Salem
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT referred to Article 2(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT Statute and held that the Appellant did not show any errors in the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT judgment and her claims on appeal could not succeed. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT further found no fault in Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT¡¯s finding that there was no retaliation against the Appellant and that Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT did not err on a question of law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision, nor did it commit an error in procedure, such as to affect the decision of the case. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that it was within the discretion of the Agency to close the case against the PMO and that the Agency has no authority to...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-856, Abu Malluh et al.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT considered the Secretary-General's appeal, specifically as to whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT¡¯s decision to award special allowances for extra duties performed and compensation for moral damages was an error in law or fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision. With respect to the allowance for extra duties, Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT noted that it is settled in its jurisprudence that the Agency has discretionary powers to pay the special allowances, which must be exercised reasonably in accordance with their substantive legal requirements. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that there was no room for Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµRWA DT to substitute its decision...
2018-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-857, Clemente
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that the Appellant failed to challenge the decision that denied the reclassification of her post from a G-8 to a P-2 position within the deadlines of the ICAO Staff Rules 111. 1(7) and 111. 1(5), confirming AJAB¡¯s finding. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that there is no obligation of the ICAO Secretary-General to provide a staff member with guidance on the appeals procedure and to advise regarding the time limits. Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT held that it does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the claims the Appellant raises on appeal against the decision that her post was incorrectly classified at the G-8 level...