Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/069, Castelli
The Tribunal carefully examined all the correspondence between the parties and was not persuaded by the Respondent¡¯s argument that the contested administrative decision was conclusively made and communicated to the Applicant on 28 June 2016. The Tribunal was of the view that the correspondence between the parties did not bear out the said argument and found that the Respondent had not apprised himself of all relevant facts on 28 June 2016 when he rejected the claim for an education grant and reimbursement of mother tongue tuition. In the prevailing circumstances, the Tribunal held that the...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/068, Nikolarakis
How to measure a loss of change. The Tribunal finds that, as stated in Niedermayr, the assessment of loss of chance is an inexact science, and the Tribunal must assess the matter in the round and arrive at a figure deemed to be fair and equitable having regard to the number of imponderables present in the case, including the chances of being selected. The Tribunal should take into account two matters: (a) the nature of the irregularity and (b), thereafter in the assessment, all the imponderables, noting all the while that this is an inexact science (Niedermayr). The Tribunal notes the...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/067, Nakase
The Tribunal held that the uncontested evidence before it was that the General-Assembly endorsed the Secretary-General¡¯s recommendation for the abolishment of 80 Language Assistant posts, including the one encumbered by the Applicant. The Tribunal found and held that the decision not to renew the Applicant¡¯s fixed-term appointment was lawful as it was a proper implementation by the Secretary-General of the General Assembly¡¯s decision. In his submissions, the Applicant had indicated that the Organization had abolished his post, but later hired him as an Individual Consultant (IC). He contended...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/066, Bahrdwaj
Functus Officio: A final decision cannot be reopened, and once the duties and functions of an office are fully discharged, there is no legal competence for reconsideration of the decision by that office. The Dispute Tribunal ceased to have any jurisdiction over the Applicant¡¯s case once the initial judgment was rendered and without the case being remanded by the Appeals Tribunal, the Dispute Tribunal cannot examine the application any further.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/064, Coker
Noting that the Applicant had conceded that his application was filed after the time limit set out in art. 8.1(d)(i)(b), the Tribunal concluded that the application was not receivable rationae temporis because the Applicant failed to comply with the 90-day filing deadline set out in art. 8.1(d) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT Statute. The Tribunal then deliberated on the Applicant¡¯s assertion that his application is receivable because the interpretation of art. 8.1(d)(i)(b) is unfair to staff members as it favours an administration that has failed to address management evaluation requests in violation of staff...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/065, Gurudutta
Functus Officio: A final decision cannot be reopened, and once the duties and functions of an office are fully discharged, there is no legal competence for reconsideration of the decision by that office. The Dispute Tribunal ceased to have any jurisdiction over the Applicant¡¯s case once the initial judgment was rendered and without the case being remanded by the Appeals Tribunal, the Dispute Tribunal cannot examine the application any further.
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/063, Nchimbi
Granting an application for revision: As consistently held by the Appeals Tribunal, ¡°the review procedure [of revision] is of a corrective nature and thus is not an opportunity for a party to reargue his or her case¡± (see Sanwidi 2013-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-321, para. 8. Moreover, an application for revision of a judgment is only receivable if it fulfills the strict and exceptional criteria established under art. 12.1 of the Dispute Tribunal¡¯s Statute and art. 29 of its Rules of Procedure, namely (see James 2016-Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµAT-680, para. 13): ¡°¡ Accordingly, an application for revision of judgment is only receivable if...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/062, Chama
The impugned decision of 21 April 2015 clearly: a) emanated from the Administration and b) produced direct legal consequences for the terms and conditions of the Applicant¡¯s appointment. As such, the decision was capable of being subject to management evaluation as well as capable of being reviewed by the Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT. The Applicant had until 90 days from 8 June 2015 to file an application before Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT. The Applicant did not do so until 1 March 2016. The application is, therefore, late by almost six months. The Applicant did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances that would warrant waiving the time...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/061, Mbok
The Tribunal held that MONUSCO¡¯s 17 October 2014 inter-office memorandum unambiguously informed the Applicant of the mission¡¯s decision to end his appointment, which at this point was a continuing appointment, by separating him from service on 24 October 2014. The Tribunal held that the 17 October 2014 inter-office memorandum was an administrative decision because it had a direct and adverse impact on the Applicant¡¯s contractual status and had direct legal consequences for him. The Tribunal concluded that the FPD/DFS response of 31 October 2016 was a reiteration of the 17 October 2014 decision...
Ä¢¹½ÊÓÆµDT/2017/059, Monticelli
The Tribunal is required to factually find that the decision that is impugned before it is in the process of being administratively reviewed. A preliminary finding to this effect is a prerequisite for litigation before this Tribunal. The record before the Tribunal did not show that a request for management evaluation had been filed by the Applicant. The Applicant was given the opportunity to address this situation and correct it, but did not. The application therefore was found incompetent and the only option open to the Tribunal was to summarily dismiss it for want of management evaluation.