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Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General raised the argument, inter alia, that Ms Lamb¡¯s retroactive appointment was disrupted when she resigned and separated and, therefore, she had no contractual relationship with the Organisation obliging it to place her preferentially in vacant posts as someone holding a permanent appointment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT concluded correctly that (1) Ms Lamb¡¯s employment ended in mid-2013 by her own initiative and (2) there was nothing in the documentation relating to Ms Lamb¡¯s resignation to support her assertion that it was...

As a preliminary matter, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered the Appellant¡¯s daughters applications for intervention which argued that they had been deprived of their right to education due to their mother¡¯s arbitrary separation from service, as their mother lost her only main source of income, including the education grant, and could not support their education. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute, the daughters did not fall within the categories of persons who had the standing to intervene, and denied the applications for intervention. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant failed...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any errors of law or fact in finding that the applications were not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Local Salary Survey Committee (LSSC) does not constitute a technical body and therefore does not exempt the Appellants from the mandatory first step of requesting a management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgments.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT did not commit any errors of law or fact in finding that the applications were not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Local Salary Survey Committee (LSSC) does not constitute a technical body and therefore does not exempt the Appellants from the mandatory first step of requesting management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Appellant¡¯s application regarding the implied decision conveyed in a conversation with his colleague was, indeed, not receivable ratione materiae. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a later letter of response from the Administration effectively re-set the clock for the Appellant to file his request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the express decision in the letter, containing the rejection of the Appellant¡¯s complaint and the reasons, therefore, was not a mere confirmation of the previous implied administrative decision, but a new, appealable decision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the Appellant¡¯s motion to file additional pleadings on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the filing. On the merits, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT calculation of the three-time periods of participation in the contributory health insurance plan was not correct. However, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that even the correct calculation did not result in the required 10 years of participation, but only 9 years, 10 months, and 14 days. Turning to consider the period of 11 May to 30 June 2009, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that a staff member who had expressly conceded in her application that a...

The Appellant challenged Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT¡¯s finding that his application was not receivable ratione materiae. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable ratione materiae as he did not make a timely request for management evaluation. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵRWA DT judgment.

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an application for revision of judgment No. 2019-Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT-914 from Mr Oglesby. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Mr Oglesby failed to establish the required grounds for a revision of judgment, namely the discovery of a decisive fact that was, at the time the judgment was rendered, unknown to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT and the party applying for revision. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT noted that it had concluded in the impugned judgment that it was unable to apply the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵ Charter or the UDHR directly, or strike down clear Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF Regulations. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT opined that it was within the combined powers of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵJSPF, the Secretary-General and the General...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT rejected the Appellant¡¯s unsubstantiated allegations of bias and conflict of interest against the judge who signed the impugned judgment. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered that: (1) the Appellant did not provide any evidence of his suitability for conversion to a continuing appointment; (2) his appeal was based solely on the impossibility of the retroactive extension of his fixed-term appointments; and (3) he had been made aware that his fixed-term appointment would be extended pending the appropriate assessment of his performance under the rebuttal process. Accordingly, Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT was correct...

Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT considered an appeal of Order No. 079. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that, regardless of whether Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT may have committed an error of law, fact, or procedure, Article 2(2) of the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Statute precluded an appeal to Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT if Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted within its jurisdiction or competence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT acted within its jurisdiction or competence. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT held that the appeal was not receivable. Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Ä¢¹½ÊÓƵDT Order.